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POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS*
SETH W. STOUGHTON**
Since the summer of 2014, community members, politicians, and
police executives across the country have called for greater police
accountability and improvements in police-community relations.
Body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) are widely seen as serving both
ends. Today, thousands of police agencies are exploring,
adopting, and implementing body-cam programs. BWCs are
here, and more are coming. Legal scholars have largely
responded to this burgeoning new technology by addressing it
through the framework of traditional discussions about privacy,
police accountability, or the rules of evidence. Relatively few
articles have gone further by identifying the potential benefits of
BWCs and critically examining whether the adoption of this
technology by police agencies can truly do what many
proponents claim. This Article falls solidly into the latter camp.
Body-worn cameras are a tool. Tools should be used to advance
normatively desirable goals when they are an efficient way of
accomplishing or facilitating those goals. Body-worn cameras,
like any tool, should not be used when the goal itself is
inappropriate or when the tool is ill-suited for the job at hand.
This Article explores the limits of BWCs as a tool. It does so by
first reviewing the historical justifications for, implementation of,
and lessons learned from an earlier iteration of police video
recording technology: in-car cameras. It then offers a simplified
way of conceptualizing the multitudinous advantages that BWC
proponents have identified, putting them into three categories:
symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and informational
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benefits. This classification is a necessary first step in police
agencies and communities articulating what they hope to achieve
with a BWC program. Whether body cams will advance the
desired goals depends on the practical limitations of the
technology and our ability to interpret the resulting video footage
as well as the policies and procedures that govern
implementation. The latter half of the paper is dedicated to a
critical examination of the practical limitations and policy
considerations that will ultimately determine whether body-worn
cameras can live up to the hype.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin found that the New York Police
Department’s widespread and aggressive use of stop-and-frisks had
violated civilians’ constitutional rights.1 She ordered the agency to
“institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras [would] be
worn for a one-year period by officers on patrol.”2 Having video
footage of officers’ interactions with civilians, Judge Scheindlin wrote,
“will serve a variety of useful functions.”3 That sentiment was
popularized in the aftermath of Officer Darren Wilson’s fatal
shooting of Michael Brown in the then little-known St. Louis suburb
of Ferguson, Missouri—among the first in a series of violent incidents
1. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2. Id. at 685.
3. Id.
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that attracted public scrutiny and widespread criticism of the police.4
Community members, politicians, and police executives across the
4. Other incidents in and after the summer 2014 have kept a public spotlight on
policing, including, but certainly not limited to, the July 17, 2014, asphyxiation of Eric
Garner, who was selling loose cigarettes; the August 5, 2014, shooting of John Crawford,
who was in a Walmart store holding a pellet rifle he had picked up in one of the aisles; the
November 20, 2014, shooting of Akai Gurley, who was shot while his girlfriend was
braiding his hair in an apartment stairwell; the November 22, 2014, shooting of Tamir
Rice, who was playing with a realistic-looking pellet gun in a public park; the April 4, 2015,
shooting of Walter Scott, who was fleeing on foot from a traffic stop; the October 20, 2014,
shooting of Laquan McDonald, who was walking down the street with a knife; the April
12, 2015, death of Freddie Gray, who had been arrested and put into a prisoner transport
van; the June 5, 2015, use of force against children at a pool party in McKinney, Texas; the
July 19, 2015, shooting of Samuel DuBose during a traffic stop; the August 7, 2015,
shooting of Christian Taylor, who had broken into a car dealership; the July 5, 2016,
shooting of Alton Sterling, who had been tackled by officers after allegedly threatening
someone with a gun; the July 6, 2016, shooting of Philando Castile, who informed an
officer during a stop that he was carrying a firearm; and the July 10, 2015, traffic stop and
arrest of Sandra Bland, who committed suicide in a jail cell three days later. Ryllie
Danylko, Cleveland Police Officer Fatally Shoots 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/11
/cleveland_police_officer_fatal.html [https://perma.cc/G299-SKVM]; Quinn Ford, Cops:
Boy, 17, Fatally Shot by Officer After Refusing to Drop Knife, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-chicago-shootings-violence20141021-story.html [https://perma.cc/6CUF-NDGC]; Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber,
Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014, at
A1; Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing
John Crawford III, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-surveillance-video-shows-police-shooting-andkilling-john-crawford-iii/?utm_term=.cb8846245191
[https://perma.cc/W7E8-YTCT];
Michael E. Miller et al., How a Cellphone Video Led to Murder Charges Against a Cop in
North Charleston, S.C., WASH. POST (April 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/08/how-a-cell-phone-video-led-to-murder-charges-againsta-cop-in-north-charleston-s-c/?utm_term=.0c8b36b3a957 [https://perma.cc/P58Y-EFY9];
David Montgomery, New Details Released in Sandra Bland’s Death in Texas Jail, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/us/new-details-released-insandra-blands-death-in-texas-jail.html?smid=pl-share
[https://perma.cc/67MX-NEDQ
(dark archive)]; Richard Pérez-Peña, University of Cincinnati Officer Indicted in Shooting
Death of Samuel Dubose, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30
/us/university-of-cincinnati-officer-indicted-in-shooting-death-of-motorist.html [https://perma.cc
/L8AP-FB4N (dark archive)]; Kristine Phillips, Black Teen Who Was Slammed to the
Ground by a White Cop at Texas Pool Party Sues for $5 million, WASH. POST (Jan. 5,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/01/05/black-teenagerwho-was-slammed-to-the-ground-at-texas-pool-party-sues-ex-cop-city-for-5m/?utm_term=
.f8a9048cfef8 [https://perma.cc/QWM9-C9R8]; Kevin Rector, The 45-Minute Mystery of
Freddie Gray’s death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news
/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-gray-ticker-20150425-story.html [https://perma.cc/QUZ6KEZR]; Rebecca R. Ruiz, U.S. Won’t Charge Two Officers In a 2016 Killing of a Black
Man, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2017, at A1, A11; Police Shooting During Traffic Stop Leaves
Minnesota Man Dead, CBS NEWS (July 7, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/policeshooting-during-traffic-stop-leaves-minnesota-man-dead-family/ [https://perma.cc/QB2P9KBP]; Liam Stack, Answers Sought in Another Police Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2015, at A19; Michael Wilson, City Officer’s Errant Shot Kills an Unarmed Man, N.Y.
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country called for greater police accountability and improvements in
police-community relations. Body-worn cameras (“body cams” or
“BWCs”) were and are widely seen as serving both ends.
The combination of public demand and federal or private
funding has led thousands of police agencies to explore, adopt, and
implement body-cam programs. A 2015 survey by the Major Cities
Chiefs Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association found
that ninety-five percent of surveyed agencies had either implemented
or were committed to implementing a BWC program.5 By the middle
of 2016, half of the seventy largest cities in the United States had
begun using or committed to using BWCs.6 In November of that year,
a market survey commissioned by the National Institute of Justice
identified sixty-six different BWC models by dozens of different
vendors.7 Competition between the largest vendors was fierce. In
April 2017, TASER International officially changed its name to
Axon—the name of its market-dominating body-cam system—and
offered all interested police agencies free cameras for a year.8
Body-worn cameras are here, and more are coming.9 It is not
difficult to figure out why. As Howard Wasserman has pointed out:
Supporters promote body cameras as a panacea; they are
spoken of as the singularly effective solution to the problem,
able to prevent “another Ferguson.” And the public perceives
them as that comprehensive cure to the problem. Video tells us
exactly what happened, entirely eliminates the he-said/he-said
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2014, at A1, A3. Whether any of the officers involved in these incidents
acted appropriately or inappropriately is outside the scope of this discussion; I identify the
incidents for the limited point of noting that they have drawn substantial and sustained
public attention to policing.
5. LAFAYETTE GRP., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS & MAJOR CTY. SHERIFFS, SURVEY OF
TECH. NEEDS—BODY WORN CAMERAS ii (2015), https://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users
/iqjWHBFdfxIU/rvnT.EAJQwK4/v0 [https://perma.cc/QD3P-VUC2].
6. Rachel Lerman, Body Cameras Now in Half of Big City Police Departments,
SEATTLE TIMES (July 7, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/bodycameras-now-in-half-of-big-city-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/V7RM-CLEZ].
7. VIVIAN HUNG, STEVEN BABIN & JACQUELINE COBERLY, A MARKET SURVEY
ON BODY WORN CAMERA TECH. 1–9 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants
/250381.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXD5-SYQF].
8. Josh Sanburn, The Company that Makes Tasers Is Giving Free Body Cameras to
Police, TIME (Apr. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4726775/axon-taser-free-body-cameras-police/
[https://perma.cc/27BN-J6AF].
9. Exactly where they are coming may depend on local characteristics. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey S. Nowacki & Dale Willits, Adoption of Body Cameras by United States Police
Agencies: An Organisational Analysis, 26 POLICING & SOC’Y 1 (2016) (finding that police
agencies that identify as technological innovators are more likely to adopt BWCs, but
“agencies with large operating budgets and agencies represented by collective bargaining
units are less likely” to adopt them).
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ambiguity that often characterizes police-citizen encounters,
and deters misbehavior by police and citizens.10
The popular belief in the inherent superiority of video footage has led
to what Mary Fan calls the “camera cultural revolution.”11 The result,
she predicts, is that “the future will be recorded.”12
Legal scholars have largely responded to this burgeoning new
technology by addressing it through the framework of traditional
discussions about privacy, police accountability, or the rules of
evidence.13 Relatively few articles have gone further by identifying the
potential benefits of BWCs and critically examining whether the
adoption of this technology by police agencies can truly do what the

10. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
831, 833 (2015) (presenting exaggerated claims about body cameras as a foil).
11. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 907–08 (2017).
12. Id. at 928, 934.
13. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 442 (2016); Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time
Machines (And What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
933, 972 (2016); Martina Kitzmueller, Are You Recording This?: Enforcement of Police
Videotaping, 47 CONN. L. REV. 167, 170–73 (2014); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in
Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in
Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 614 (2017); Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police
Cameras: A Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 884 (2015);
Mark Tunick, Regulating Public Access to Body Camera Footage: Response to Iesha S.
Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 143, 150 (2016).
Body-worn cameras have also provided fodder for a slew of research by law students,
the vast majority of which follows in the same vein. See, e.g., Bradley X. Barbour, Note,
Big Budget Productions with Limited Release: Video Retention Issues with Body-Worn
Cameras, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1725, 1755 (2017); Joey Dhillon, Note, Police BodyMounted Cameras: Balancing the Interests of Citizens and the State, 25 S. CAL. REV. L. &
SOC. JUST. 69, 85 (2015); Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy
Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 91,
132–33 (2015); V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras and Criminal Discovery, 104 GEO.
L.J. 1581, 1585–86 (2016); Mindy Lawrence, Note, Lights, Camera, Action: The Age of
Body Cameras in Law Enforcement and the Effects of Implementing Body Camera
Programs in Rural Communities, 91 N.D. L. REV. 611, 613 (2015); Dru S. Letourneau,
Comment, Police Body Cameras: Implementation with Caution, Forethought, and Policy,
50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439, 475 (2015); Richard Lin, Note, Police Body Worn Cameras and
Privacy: Retaining Benefits While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
346, 365 (2016); Kyle J. Maury, Note, Police Body-Worn Camera Policy: Balancing the
Tension Between Privacy and Public Access in State Laws, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
551 (2016); Iesha S. Nunes, Note, ‘‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”: Police Misconduct and the
Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1811, 1843 (2015); Ethan Thomas, Note, The
Privacy Case for Body Cameras: The Need for a Privacy-Centric Approach to Body
Camera Policymaking, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 191, 227–28 (2017).
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many proponents claim.14 This Article falls solidly into the latter
camp.
This Article is not intended to endorse or condemn police body
cams, but rather to identify and critically examine the potential
benefits of the technology in light of its capabilities and limitations.
For more than two years now, I have educated a variety of audiences
about police BWCs, from state supreme court justices to practicing
attorneys and from police executives to rank-and-file officers,15 and I

14. For exceptions, see Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the
Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for
Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 988–89 (2016); Caren Myers
Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
791, 795–96 (2017); Roseanna Sommers, Developments in the Law: Policing 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1706, 1797 (2015); Wasserman, supra note 10, at 833.
15. I have presented on police body-worn cameras for judicial audiences (including
the Conference of Chief Justices; the Midwest Conference of Chief Justices and State
Court Administrators; the National Consortium on Racial & Ethnic Fairness in the
Courts; the Ohio Judicial Conference; the Missouri Judicial Conference; the North Dakota
Judicial Conference; the South Carolina Judicial Conference; the Indiana Bench/Bar
Conference; and the Kansas Judicial Conference); legal audiences (including the Defense
Research Institute; the South Carolina Solicitors’ Conference; and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Body-Camera Task Force); police audiences
(including the Chicago Civilian Office of Police Accountability; the Peace Officers’
Association of Georgia; a United States Inspectors General Investigators Training
conference; senior executives at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives; the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; and the Legal Liability and
Risk Management Institute); and technology audiences (including the International
Association of Privacy Professionals and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Public Safety Video Analytics Working Group). I have also presented similar
information at talks at Savannah Law School, William & Mary Law School, and in
multiple out-of-class presentations here at the University of South Carolina School of
Law. My work on BWCs has been featured widely in the media both domestically and
internationally. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Criminal Defense Attorney Group Releases
Recommendations for Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/03/22/criminal-defense-groupreleases-recommendations-for-body-cameras/?utm_term=.582ccd752ef7 [https://perma.cc
/J5UT-FEZD]; Radley Balko, Police Cameras Are a Tool. It’s How We Use This Tool That
Matters, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2016/03/15/police-cameras-are-a-tool-its-how-we-use-this-tool-that-matters/?utm
_term=.32b69e71b484 [https://perma.cc/9T32-AGUF]; The Fifth Estate, Deception and
Police-Worn Body Cameras, YOUTUBE, at 0.33 (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=PQMLN_nkGC4 [https://perma.cc/BP35-W77Y]; Yaniv Kubovich, Police Body
Cams Pit Violence Against Privacy, HAARETZ (May 15, 2016), https://www.haaretz.com
/israel-news/.premium-police-body-cams-pit-violence-against-privacy-1.5383104 [https://perma.cc
/4YES-7JAR]; Test: Wat Zie Jij in Deze Bodycam-Beelden?, NOS (June 7, 2016),
https://nos.nl/op3/artikel/2109597-test-wat-zie-jij-in-deze-bodycam-beelden.html [https://perma.cc
/JRL7-XD4M]; TODAY Show: Police Body Cameras: Can You Always Believe What They
Show? (NBC television broadcast May 16, 2016), https://www.today.com/video/policebody-cameras-can-you-always-believe-what-they-show-686449731595 [https://perma.cc/UX4Y
-3EXW]; Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES
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have repeatedly been asked some variant of what appears to be a
simple question: is the adoption of body cameras a good idea? My
response is no doubt familiar to law students across the country: it
depends. Body-worn cameras are a tool. Tools should be used to
accomplish normatively desirable tasks when they are an efficient way
of accomplishing or facilitating that task. Following that logic, tools
should not be used when the task itself is inappropriate or when the
tool is ill-suited for the job at hand. To make this point more directly,
consider that most indelicate of tools: the hammer. For some tasks,
such as putting in nails, the hammer is among the best possible tools
to use. For other tasks, such as extracting nails, the hammer is a
perfectly reasonable option even though other tools, such as a nail
puller or cat’s paw crowbar, may prove marginally more efficacious.
For some tasks, such as cleaning a windshield, using a hammer will
not only be ineffective, it may prove destructively counterproductive.
And some tasks, like bashing in another person’s head, are
themselves so objectionable that a hammer should not be used even if
its use would easily accomplish the task.
The analogy between body cams and hammers is, of course,
inexact. While the relative capabilities and limitations of a hammer
are both well-known and easily capable of being identified through
even a superficial examination, the potential value and constraints of
a body-worn camera system are more speculative and not
immediately obvious. Regrettably, the lack of clear information can
lead public officials and police executives to give substantially more
consideration to the technical questions of how BWCs should be
acquired and deployed than the more complicated questions of what
agencies are trying to achieve with their use and whether BWCs are
an appropriate and efficient tool.16 That is, the real difficulty with
body cams is both pinpointing ex ante what the jurisdiction or agency
is trying to accomplish with a BWC system and recognizing the
various factors that are likely to affect a body cams’ value in that
context.
This Article seeks to elevate public discourse about body-worn
cameras. It provides a simplified framework that police executives,
elected officials, and community members can apply to make more
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video
.html [https://perma.cc/4DNC-456Z (dark archive)].
16. This observation is not limited to BWC programs or to police agencies. Mats
Alvesson and André Spicer have observed that this phenomenon, which they identify as
an aspect of “functional stupidity,” is endemic in private organizations. MATS ALVESON &
ANDRÉ SPICER, THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 8–13 (2016).
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informed decisions about whether and how to implement body-worn
cameras.17
Part I reviews the justifications for, implementation of, and
lessons learned from in-car camera systems (or “dash cams”).
Although broadly accepted and widely used today, in-car camera
systems were adopted by police agencies much more hesitantly and
over a much longer period of time than BWC systems appear to be.
Historically, dash cams were justified by their ability to record video
that was believed to provide three discrete benefits: it was persuasive
evidence in DUI cases, it could establish the validity of a defendant’s
consent to search a vehicle that contained drugs, and it was originally
thought to help gather information about, if not reduce or eliminate,
racial profiling. As officers and administrators became accustomed to
the new technology, the list of potential benefits continued to grow.
This Part discusses the results and shortcomings of one of the few
studies that attempted a comprehensive review of in-car camera
systems.
Part II tackles the multitude of different benefits that politicians,
police executives, officers, and activists believe or have hoped that
body-worn cameras will provide by offering a three-part taxonomy.
All of the purported benefits fall, this Article asserts, into one of
three categories: symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and
informational benefits. The symbolic benefits of body cams relate to
the potential effect on police-community relations and particularly
the extent to which the adoption and implementation of a body-worn
camera program can communicate to the public that the agency is
aware of, respectful of, and responsive to concerns about
accountability and transparency. The behavioral benefits relate to the
purported ability of body-worn cameras to encourage lawful and
appropriate behavior, increase civility, and decrease physical
resistance by civilians and the use of force by officers. The
informational benefits relate to the potential for BWC videos to
provide more and better information about police encounters than we
would otherwise have, along with the various uses to which that
information could be put.
The potential benefits outlined in Part II are just that: potential
benefits. Whether an agency that adopts body-worn cameras will
17. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(analyzing the unique benefits of body-worn cameras both generally and as applied to the
case at hand, and “ordering the NYPD to institute a pilot program in which body-worn
cameras will be worn for a one year period by officers on patrol in one precinct per
borough”).
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enjoy those benefits depends heavily on the practical limitations of
the technology and our ability to use it effectively and the policy
choices that police agencies make when they implement a BWC
program. Part III addresses the former, while Part IV reviews some of
the more difficult aspects of the latter. This Article concludes that
policymakers can make informed decisions about whether to adopt
body cams, which camera system to use, and how to deploy BWCs
only after reviewing the practical limitations and policy implications
that affect each potential benefit and considering how to best manage
any incidental effects.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE VIDEO
It is no exaggeration to say that today’s police officers and the
first “modern” police officers would scarcely recognize each other.18
Most large cities in the United States had police departments by the
1850s, but the officers did not wear uniforms and were typically
prohibited from carrying firearms.19 As policing has evolved, it has
adopted a range of once-new-and-now-familiar equipment and
technology, some of which has dramatically changed the practice, and
sometimes the very nature, of policing. Each change evoked acclaim
and criticism from the public, police administrators, and officers
themselves.20
Police communications have shifted from in-person interactions
to police callboxes to in-car wireless radios to today’s portable digital
radios and cellular communications technology.21 Dispatch and police
records have changed from index cards and paper files to computeraided dispatch systems and electronic filing and records-management
systems. Patrol routines, once limited to highly diffused officers
working a foot-patrol beat, have so thoroughly shifted with the advent
of police vehicles that “[t]he patrol car became the symbol of
policing . . . represent[ing] mobility, power, conspicuous presence,

18. Exactly when cities in the United States adopted the modern approach to policing
is difficult to identify with any precision, but by all accounts the institution is less than 200
years old. Seth W. Stoughton, The Blurred Blue Line: Reform in an Era of Public and
Private Policing, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 125–27 (2017).
19. WILLIAM J. BOPP & DONALD O. SCHULTZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT 27–28, 38 (1972).
20. Id. at 46–47; DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY
25–26 (1981).
21. See, e.g., The Network, FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/network [https://perma.cc
/J6PD-HV5G].
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control of officers, and professional distance from citizens.”22 Police
weaponry has changed, too. In the context of lethal weaponry, the
revolvers of yesteryear have given way to the semi-automatic
handguns that are issued today, with shotguns and rifles often added
to the mix. The expansive menu of less-lethal weaponry starts with
the original police weapon, the baton, and includes the chemical
sprays and electric cattle prods that were used against demonstrators
and protestors in the 1960s,23 TASERS and other “stun guns” and the
large caliber “baton round” launchers that date from the 1970s,24
Pepperballs (a paintball filled with a liquid or powder irritating agent)
in the late 1990s,25 and the acoustic or microwave weaponry of the
early- and mid-2000s.26
Investigative equipment and technology, too, has changed
substantially. Police agencies around the country now employ
automated license plate readers, gunfire detection systems,27 radar
and LIDAR speed detection devices, laser scanners for forensic
measurements, drones and other remote-piloted robotic tools, and so
on.
Comparatively speaking, the history of police-video recording is
of much more recent vintage than other technological innovations.
Although there were failed attempts to install cameras in police
vehicles as early as the 1930s28—“[t]he camera was on a small tripod

22. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4 PERSP.
ON POLICING 8 (1988).
23. DARIES REJALI, TORTURE & DEMOCRACY 226–29 (2009); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE & THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE 75 (Free Press et al. eds., 1993); Daniel A. Gross, The Forgotten History of Mace,
Designed by a 29-Year-Old and Reinvented as a Police Weapon, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Nov.
4, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/forgotten-history-mace-designed-29year-old-and-reinvented-police-weapon-180953239/#8meYgGEJ6oIMYyTE.99 [https://perma.cc
/JFS6-8AWQ].
24. REJALI, supra note 23, at 229.
25. Advanced Interactive Systems, Inc. and PepperBall Technologies, Inc. Join Forces,
POLICEONE.COM (Apr. 7, 2004), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/less-lethal
/press-releases/84200-Advanced-Interactive-Systems-Inc-and-PepperBall-TechnologiesInc-Join-Forces/ [https://perma.cc/8UXB-9WXH].
26. Colin Moynihan, Noise as a Weapon? Police Use of Sound Cannons Questioned,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/nyregion/sound-cannonprotest-lawsuit-long-range-acoustic-device.html [https://perma.cc/DV2R-A7EN (dark
archive)]; Rania Khalek, 6 Creepy New Weapons the Police and Military Use to Subdue
Unarmed People, ALTERNET (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.alternet.org/story/151864/6_creepy
_new_weapons_the_police_and_military_use_to_subdue_unarmed_people [https://perma.cc/GSF85N2N].
27. SHOTSPOTTER, http://www.shotspotter.com/ [https://perma.cc/553X-RK55].
28. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON
MODERN POLICING: RESEARCH & BEST PRACTICES FROM THE IACP STUDY ON IN-CAR
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that required the full passenger side of the front seat with the back
seat fully loaded with a recorder and cables”29—it is more accurate to
say that police-video recording is celebrating its thirtieth birthday.
When they were first commercially introduced in the late 1980s,
dash cams were not particularly popular. The notion of private
ownership of video-playing hardware was still new and largely alien.
By 1985, only seventeen percent of households had a Video Cassette
Recording (“VCR”) system,30 which some number of readers will
recall played Video Home System (“VHS”) tapes. Private ownership
of those VHS cassettes—the recording medium of the day—was rare;
rentals were the norm. In 1987, Paramount Pictures shocked the
video industry by announcing that cassettes of Top Gun would be
sold for a mere $26.95, “the lowest introductory price ever asked for a
major movie on cassette.”31
In the policing context, the cameras that could be mounted in
vehicles were large, difficult to install, and expensive.32 Each unit had
three components—the camera itself, a monochromatic playback unit
that could be mounted overhead or between the front seats, and a
VCR secured in a locking stainless steel box that was typically
mounted in the passenger foot-well, the back seat, or the trunk; all of
the components had to be wired together.33 The high price and
difficulty of installation and maintenance limited the initial adoption

CAMERAS 5 (2004). The IACP report cites an article in Popular Science magazine but
incorrectly reports that the article was about a Connecticut article in the 1960s. In fact, the
article was published in September 1939 and is about Officer R.H. Galbraith of the
California Highway Patrol. Movie Camera in Police Car Puts Evidence on Film, MODERN
MECHANIX (Mar. 14, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20120314041757/http://blog
.modernmechanix.com/2012/03/09/movie-camera-in-police-car-puts-evidence-on-film/
[https://perma.cc/XGU5-H2A6].
29. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 28, at 5.
30. Trish Hall, Electronics: It’s Not Home Without It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at
C6.
31. See Aljean Harmetz, Marketing ‘Top Gun’ Cassette, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/15/arts/marketing-top-gun-cassette.html [https://perma.cc
/9VGA-WLYN (dark archive)].
32. One news report from 1993 put the price of an in-car camera system at $1,750.
Law Enforcement Agencies Get Cameras, GOUPSTATE.COM, http://www.goupstate.com
/article/NC/19931005/News/605197740/SJ/ [https://perma.cc/6LXW-SD6T (dark archive)].
Adjusted for inflation, the cost of the camera system in 2017 dollars is $3,000. CPI
INFLATION
CALCULATOR,
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1750&year1
=199301&year2=201704 [https://perma.cc/TX9Y-L7KJ].
33. The components of the L3’s Mobile Vision In-Car Video System, for example, can
still be found and purchased online. M3 Mobile Vision MV-7 In Car Video System,
VoiceLink Microphone + Extras, EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/itm/M3-Mobile-VisionMV-7-In-Car-Video-System-VoiceLink-Plus-Microphone-Extras-/132424099234 [https://perma.cc
/VG88-W34L].
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by police agencies. It may also have been true that police executives
did not feel a compelling need to adopt in-car camera systems; after
all, officers had never had them before and their absence had not
hindered police operations.
Over the next fifteen years, agencies began to adopt dash cams
more readily for four separate reasons, presented here
chronologically. First, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, which had
been founded in 1980, began providing grants or directly purchasing
in-car camera systems for police agencies in the late 1980s and early
1990s.34 For drunk-driving cases, video footage from in-car camera
systems was viewed as “a ‘defense killer’” that could dramatically
increase the potential for a prosecution to end in a plea deal.35 As
public perceptions shifted, video footage was believed to be necessary
for fact-finders to fairly assess the situation, including the defendant’s
performance on field sobriety exercises. Since 1998, for example,
South Carolina has required video recordings in DUI prosecutions;
subject to a few exceptions, the arresting officer must provide a video
recording of the investigation both at the site of the stop and at the
location of the breath testing or submit an affidavit explaining why
video was not available.36
Second, dash cams were a response to the public outcry that
followed from the Rodney King beating, fortuitously filmed by a
bystander with a personal camcorder in March 1991. Then, as now,
public demand for police accountability and the police interest in
protecting officers from frivolous allegations of misconduct both
contributed to the adoption of in-car camera systems.37
Third, by the mid-1990s, the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) had become concerned about the number of drug
possession cases that were not resulting in convictions. At issue in
those cases was the validity of a motorist’s consent to a police search
of his vehicle.38 The DEA began to offer funding for local police
agencies to acquire in-car camera systems because the video would,
they believed, help prosecutors prove to skeptical judges and juries
that someone who was “transporting large quantities of narcotics and

34. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 28, at 5.
35. Law Enforcement Agencies Get Cameras, supra note 32.
36. Act of June 29, 1998, No. 434, 1998 S.C. Acts 3205 (codified as amended at S.C.
CODE. ANN. § 56-5-2953 (2017)).
37. See Bob Sullivan, Squad Car Video Cameras Go Digital, NBC NEWS.COM (May
14,
2017),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078632/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and
_gadgets/t/squad-car-video-cameras-go-digital/ [https://perma.cc/V7FQ-GQG6].
38. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 28, at 5.
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hundreds-of-thousands of dollars of unexplainable cash would
actually give the police permission to search his/her vehicle.”39 And
they continued to offer funding, in modest amounts, because video
was powerful evidence. “Time and time again the camera
documented the consented search, which was later used to gain a
conviction.”40
Fourth, by the end of the 1990s and through the early 2000s,
public attention to and criticism of racial profiling led the Community
Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) Office at the Department of
Justice to offer substantial grant funding for agencies to purchase incar camera systems.41 In-car cameras were seen as a way to gather
critical data without requiring officers to fill out cumbersome
questionnaires after every traffic stop; legislation in Texas, Missouri,
and Minnesota, for example, required officers to record race-related
information after traffic stops but allowed agencies to install in-car
cameras “in lieu of or in addition to collecting data.”42

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 28, at 1; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
COPS OFFICE, U.S. Department of Justice Awards $3.1 Million in Grants to Purchase InCar
Cameras
(Sept.
18,
2003),
https://web.archive.org/web/20031124102306
/http://www.cops.usdoj.gov:80/Default.asp?Item=950 [https://perma.cc/7X4Y-437E]; U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE, U.S. Department of Justice Announces $3 Million in
Grants to Purchase In-Car Cameras (Nov. 13, 2002), https://web.archive.org/web
/20030316233659/http://www.cops.usdoj.gov:80/default.asp?Item=742 [https://perma.cc/T6VG6BBL]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE, U.S. Department of Justice Announces $3.2
Million in Grants to Purchase In-Car Cameras (Sept. 21, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web
/20011119131008/http://www.usdoj.gov:80/cops/news_info/press_releases/pr_9_21_01c.htm
[https://perma.cc/GBG6-HFA3]. It was also perceived at the time that there was an
increase in the number of assaults on officers and that in-car camera systems would
increase officer safety. Id. The Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted Data
collected and maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation does not support the
observation that there was a long-term increase in assaults on officers. There was a
dramatic drop in assaults on officers in 1996 (46,608 assaults on offices compared to a tenyear average of 63,475 assaults on officers) with an increase in 1997 (52,149 assaults on
officers compared to a ten-year average of 62,576 assaults) and 1998 (60,673 assaults on
officers compared to 62,768 assaults). Over the next few years, the number of assaults on
officers fluctuated between almost 56,000 in 1999 and over 59,000 in 2002, yet the average
continued to drop from 62,148 in 1999 to 58,049 in 2002. Law Enforcement Officers Killed
and Assaulted: Number of Assaults and Percent Injured by Type of Weapon, 1996–2005,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM (2005), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2005
/table68.htm [https://perma.cc/B25R-8P2M].
42. See, e.g., AMY FARRELL ET AL., NEW CHALLENGES IN CONFRONTING RACIAL
PROFILING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LEARNING FROM RESEARCH & PRACTICE 121 (2003);
Florangela Davila, Mayor’s Plan Will Gather Race Data, SEATTLE TIMES (July 19, 2002),
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020719&slug=race19m
[https://perma.cc/Z8YK-6QQA].
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Given these pressures and incentives, it should not be surprising
that in-car camera systems spread across the policing industry. In
2000, only 37% of police agencies used in-car video cameras.43 By
2007, that number had climbed to more than 60% of agencies,44 and
by 2013, the most recent year for which data are available, it had
reached 70% of agencies; today, it is almost certainly an even higher
percentage.45 The total number of vehicles equipped with camera
systems had also jumped dramatically. In 2000, in-car camera systems
had been installed in only 3,400 of state police and highway patrol
vehicles; by 2003, that number had grown to more than 17,500,
“representing 72% of total state patrol vehicles.”46
In 2001, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
conducted a study of in-car camera systems at the behest of the COPS
Office. Researchers employed a series of surveys, focus group
discussions, and interviews at dozens of state police agencies and
highway patrols that had received funding through the COPS In-Car
Camera Initiative. The first phase of the study involved forty-seven
police agencies and focused on “selection, acquisition, installation and
maintenance of in-car cameras systems, the development of relevant
policies and procedures, and in-car camera operation and training.
Agencies were also asked to highlight the obstacles encountered as
well as the benefits derived from the use of in-car cameras.”47 The
second phase of the study was limited to twenty-one agencies and
focused on “both the problems and successes that have arisen since
the implementation of their [in-car camera] program” as identified in
the “perceptions of prosecutors, police line officers, police mid-level

43. Matthew J. Hickman & Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Stat., NCJ 196002, Local Police Departments 2000, at iv (2003), https://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/lpd00.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TBV-CHJS]. Earlier data are unavailable;
prior to 2000, the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey did
not include questions about camera use. See Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Stat., NCJ-148822, Local Police Departments 1993 (1996),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Lpd93.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6TS-J48K]; Brian A.
Reaves & Andrew L. Goldberg, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Stat., NCJ
173429, Local Police Departments 1997 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/lpd97.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP64-LUX4].
44. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., NCJ
231174, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2007, at 7 (2010), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X24-DJ4H].
45. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., NCJ
248767, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 4 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQZ9-93KW].
46. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 28, at 6.
47. Id. at 7.
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managers and executive staff, as well as private citizens.”48 That study
identified a series of benefits, including:












Enhancing officer safety[;]
Improving agency accountability[;]
Reducing agency liability[;]
Simplifying incident review[;]
Enhancing new recruit and in-service training (post-incident
use of videos)[;]
Improving Community/Media perceptions[;]
Strengthening police leadership[;]
Advancing prosecution/case resolution[;]
Enhancing officer performance and professionalism[;]
Increasing homeland security[; and]
Upgrading technology policies and procedures.49

Importantly, the study reflects individuals’ perceptions and does
not attempt to track more objective measures. In the context of
officer safety, for example, the study concluded that “33% of the
officers reported in the survey that the use of the cameras caused
them to feel safer on the job, while 64% reported that the use of the
camera has had no impact on their level of personal safety.”50 But the
study did not attempt to identify whether officers were, in fact, any
safer after the introduction of cameras than they had been before. In
the same vein, civilians who were surveyed were asked about whether
being recorded would affect their behavior or their willingness to file
a complaint, but there was no attempt to determine empirically
whether these perceptions were accurate reflections of actual
practice.51 The ultimate findings of the study reflected an enthusiastic,
if empirically dubious, endorsement of the value of in-car camera
systems,52 along with exhortations that proper policies and
management are essential elements of success and this cautionary
note: “[O]nce the agency commits to the use of the in-car cameras,
the use of the systems will become the norm and not the exception.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Representative conclusions include statements such as, “The in-car camera is an
unbiased witness to events to ensure the accountability and the integrity of their officers.”
Id. at 25.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1363 (2018)

1378

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

Community leaders, the courts, and investigators will expect video
evidence in all cases.”53
If the history of in-car cameras tells us anything, it is that video
recording technology will fully solve the problems it was intended to
solve only rarely, if at all. Prosecutions for DUI, suppression motions
that attack the validity of consent, and racial profiling remain active
and, in some cases, are quite difficult problems to manage. Video
footage has certainly proven valuable on some occasions, but
acknowledging that cameras have been and can be part of a solution
is not to suggest that they are the solution.
II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS
Today, the public conversation about body-worn camera systems
largely mirrors the historical expectations of the various benefits that
police agencies and the public could realize by adopting in-car camera
systems. Commentators have provided a veritable laundry list of
advantages, but there has been little in the way of consistency in how
those advantages are defined. This Part offers a taxonomy inspired by
the tripartite justifications that Judge Scheindlin provided for
ordering the New York Police Department to begin a trial of BWCs
as one of the remedies in the Floyd v. City of New York54 litigation:
Video recordings will serve a variety of useful functions. First,
they will provide a contemporaneous, objective record of stops
and frisks, allowing for the review of officer conduct by
supervisors and the courts. . . . Second, the knowledge that an
exchange is being recorded will encourage lawful and respectful
interactions on the part of both parties. Third, the recordings
will diminish the sense on the part of those who file complaints
that it is their word against the police, and that the authorities
are more likely to believe the police. Thus, the recordings
should also alleviate some of the mistrust that has developed
between the police and the black and Hispanic communities,
based on the belief that stops and frisks are overwhelmingly
and unjustifiably directed at members of these communities.55
Those justifications gave rise to three categories that encompass
all the potential benefits of body-worn camera systems: symbolic
benefits, behavioral benefits, and informational benefits.

53. Id. at 26.
54. 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
55. Id. at 685.
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A. Symbolic Benefits
In May 2015, the Presidential Task Force on 21st Century
Policing released its final report.56 It opens with the following
statement: “Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people
they protect and serve is essential in a democracy. It is key to the
stability of our communities, the integrity of our criminal justice
system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing services.”57
Citing work by Yale Law School professor Tom Tyler and by
sociologist M. Somjen Frazer, the report explicitly ties public trust to
the perception that the police are legitimate authorities.58 Ultimately,
the Task Force would make a series of recommendations that it
organized into six different “pillars,” the first of which was “building
trust and legitimacy.”59
Legitimacy has become a buzzword in policing circles, and for
good reason. Research suggests that community members who view
police as legitimate are more likely to obey the law, cooperate with
officers, and take a favorable view of public policies that increase
police authority.60 When members of the public perceive the police as
less legitimate, in contrast, their distrust of police can make them less
likely to call for police assistance or cooperate with officers.61 Distrust
can handicap officers’ efforts in the very environments that are most
56. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015).
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 5 n.2.
59. Id. at 9.
60. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 514 (2003)
(studying how police legitimacy influences “behavioral compliance with the law,
behavioral cooperation with the police, and public willingness to support policies that
empower the police to use their discretion in enforcing the law”); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey
Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their
Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–35 (2008) (contrasting two models of
community cooperation with police, and concluding that increased perception of police
decisions as legitimate more effectively motivates cooperation than does imposing
sanctions and incentives); see also E. ALAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64 (1988) (describing the effect of community
perceptions of police legitimacy); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 5 (2006) (discussing citizens’ concerns with legal authorities); Tom R. Tyler,
Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 86 (2004)
(explaining the loose correlation between public perception of the police and effectiveness
at fighting crime, suggesting that increased legitimacy provides a more sufficient basis “for
securing compliance with the law”).
61. See Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy, 4
POLICING 203, 207 (2010) (“[P]ublic cooperation with the police was . . . strongly predicted
by legal cynicism, perceived, police legitimacy, and personal morality.”).
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in need of policing services; “typical residents in low-income urban
neighborhoods are extremely reluctant to cooperate with police in
producing crime reduction strategies.”62
When it comes to shaping public perceptions of police legitimacy,
the substantive content of the law or the ultimate results of its
application is not as important as the characteristics of the
interactions between civilians and police officers. That is, individuals’
perceptions of police legitimacy depend heavily on how they are
treated, or what has come to be called “procedural justice.”63
Procedural justice may be explained as an approach to mediating or
resolving a dispute that leads disputants to perceive that the
mediation or resolution process was fair. People are more likely to
view an encounter as procedurally just when officers solicit or are
responsive to their input, when officers are viewed as neutral and
equitable authorities, when officers treat them with dignity and
respect, and when officers are perceived as sincerely concerned with
safety and well-being.64 Procedural justice, then, depends on civilians’
perceptions of officers’ actions. Civilian perceptions depend, in part,
62. ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT 103
(2009); cf. Patrick J. Carr et al., We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A Qualitative
Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 CRIMINOLOGY
445, 446 (2007) (“[O]ther research has demonstrated that legal cynicism is very high
among residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods . . . .”); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 60, at
234 (explaining that “helping [police] has short term costs” which “could potentially be
minor inconveniences but could also involve serious danger of retaliation”); Ronald
Weitzer, White, Black, or Blue Cops? Race and Citizen Assessments of Police Officers, 28
J. CRIM. JUST. 313, 321–22 (2000) (containing a study that “shows a statistically significant
neighborhood-class effect on perceptions of how Black and White police act in the
neighborhood”).
63. See TOM TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 14 (2002). For discussion of
views of procedural justice, see generally Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Procedural Justice,
Routine Encounters and Citizen Perceptions of Police: Main Findings from the Queensland
Community Engagement Trial, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2012); Kristina
Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective When
People Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2009); Michael
D. Reisig et al., Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy, and Public Cooperation with the
Police Among Young Slovene Adults, 14 VARSTVOSLOVJE 147 (2012); Michael D. Reisig
& Camille Lloyd, Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy, and Helping the Police Fight
Crime: Results from a Survey of Jamaican Adolescents, 12 POLICE Q. 42 (2009); Sunshine
& Tyler, supra note 60, at 535–36; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the
Effective Rule of Law, CRIM. & JUST. 283 (2003); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 60, at 231;
Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal
Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCH. PUB. POL. &
L. 78, 81 (2014); Scott E. Wolfe et al., Is the Effect of Procedural Justice on Police
Legitimacy Invariant? Testing the Generality of Procedural Justice and Competing
Antecedents of Legitimacy, 32 J. QUANT. CRIM. 253 (2016); and Scott E. Wolfe, The Effect
of Low Self-Control on Perceived Police Legitimacy, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 67 (2011).
64. Tyler, supra note 60, at 94–95.
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on the civilian’s prior beliefs about police; an individual who tends to
strongly distrust the police is less likely to view an officer as a neutral
and equitable authority or as sincerely concerned with public safety.65
Trust, however, is difficult to establish when the police-community
relationship is strained by tension.
Enter police body cams. Police executives, politicians, and
policing scholars have expressed their hope that body cams would
increase public trust or explicitly asserted that the technology can or
is doing so.66 According to a survey commissioned by BWC
manufacturer Reveal and conducted by research firm YouGov, sixty
percent of Americans “believe that if all police officers wore body
cameras, police/community tensions would be reduced,” and twentyeight percent believe tension would be “[r]educed a lot.”67 The
implementation of a BWC system, it is hoped, can provide a valuable
symbolic benefit, contributing to an improvement in policecommunity relations.

65. See Roseanna Sommers, Developments in the Law, Considering Police Body
Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1799 (2015).
66. Alex Acquisto, Privacy, Right to Know Influence South Portland Police Policy on
Body Cams, THE FORECASTER (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.theforecaster.net/privacy-rightto-know-influence-south-portland-police-policy-on-body-cams/
[https://perma.cc/7C95Q7Q5] (quoting a South Portland Police Department Facebook post that said “cameras
would assist in ‘enhancing public trust’”); Carolyn Blackburne, Hagerstown Police Chief
Requesting 60 More Body Cameras, LOCALDVM.COM, http://www.localdvm.com/news
/maryland/hagerstown-police-chief-requesting-60-more-body-cameras/482855163 [https://perma.cc
/9R2M-FL5B] (quoting Hagerstown Police Chief Victor Brito saying, “The use of this
technology goes a long way to build that public trust and contributing to build the goodwill
we have in our community”); Rich Johnson, Montgomery Co. Police Body Camera
Program: So Far, So Good, WTOP (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:25PM), http://wtop.com/montgomerycounty/2017/04/13311231/ [https://perma.cc/TL6Q-TYC3] (quoting Montgomery County
Councilman Marc Elrich saying, “Having these cameras increases the public trust”); Maria
Nagle & Derek Beigh, Police: Body Cameras Will Improve Transparency, Public Trust,
PANTAGRAPH (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/police-body-cameraswill-improve-transparency-public-trust/article_c7794844-107a-5365-8411-f7360e500126.html
[https://perma.cc/86LF-9UJH] (quoting Bloomington Police Chief Brendan Heffner saying
that having a body-worn camera system “increases public trust in what we’re doing”);
Sierra Pizarro, New Body Cams for SPD May Help to “Encourage Public Trust,”
KTBS.COM (June 21, 2017), https://www.ktbs.com/community/new-body-cams-for-spd-mayhelp-to-encourage-public/article_4fbca5c6-56ca-11e7-8572-ff485e0f601f.html [https://perma.cc
/7X2D-827C] (stating that the Shreveport Police Department believes “the cameras
will . . . encourage public trust in law enforcement”); Truth, Transparency, and Trust in
Law Enforcement, KAMALA HARRIS, SENATOR, http://www.newkamalaharris.org.php569.dfw3-2.websitetestlink.com/truthtransparencytrust/
[https://perma.cc/HFY5-KUL6]
(stating that Kamala Harris supports “the adoption of body-worn cameras around the
country to improve transparency, accountability and training”).
67. Reveal Public Survey on Body Worn Cameras, YOUGOV, PLC (Sept. 2015) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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There are at least three ways in which police body cameras could
provide a symbolic benefit. First, the adoption of a BWC system can
serve as a signal to community members that the agency is both
receptive and responsive to public calls for transparency and
accountability. Knowing that an agency had directed officers to
record their interactions can, as Judge Scheindlin wrote, “diminish the
sense on the part of those who file complaints that it is their word
against the police, and that the authorities are more likely to believe
the police.”68 In this way, the body camera serves as evidence that the
agency is open to soliciting, accepting, and responding to civilian
feedback. Second, to the extent that body cameras are expected to
improve officer behavior by increasing professionalism,69 the decision
to implement a body-worn camera program can signal that the agency
is committed to promoting the type of policing that the public
expects. Finally, to the extent that body cameras are expected to
reduce police uses of force,70 their adoption can signal to the public
that the police agency is taking steps to safeguard community
members’ safety and well-being at the hands of officers.
In short, the implementation of a BWC system can provide a
valuable symbolic benefit that, it is hoped, will contribute to an
improvement in police-community relations.71
B.

Behavioral Benefits

Where the potential symbolic benefits of a body-worn camera
program are both ethereal and attenuated, the potential behavioral
benefits are more commonly seen as tangible and immediate.
Activists who want to reduce the frequency of police uses of force,
police executives who want to increase officer professionalism, and
the officers who want civilians to resist less often have all championed
body-worn cameras as a way to achieve the desired behavioral
change. As University of Pittsburgh law professor David A. Harris
explained in the first piece of legal scholarship to focus on body-worn
cameras, the technology could “increas[e] police compliance with

68. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
69. See infra Section II.B.
70. See infra Section II.B.
71. It is worth noting that the extent to which BWCs create symbolic benefits in
individual encounters with the police appears to depend on whether the civilian was aware
that the officer with whom they were interacting is equipped with a camera. Michael D.
White et al., Assessing Citizen Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras After Encounters with
Police, 40 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 689, 696 (2016).
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Fourth Amendment rules.”72 Further, “the knowledge that an
exchange is being recorded will encourage lawful and respectful
interactions on the part of both parties.”73 Officers themselves have
different expectations and perceptions of what body-worn cameras
will do, or whether they will do anything at all,74 but the belief that
they will improve officer or civilian behavior is not uncommon: a
survey of officers in Phoenix, Arizona; Spokane, Washington; and
Tempe, Arizona, found a substantial number agreed or strongly
agreed that BWCs will make citizens more respectful and cooperative
and reduce resistance, as well as making officers act more
professionally.75 A survey of officers at the Orlando Police
Department found that a substantial minority of officers, 19.8%,
believed that body-worn cameras would improve their own behavior,
and more than twice as many, 42.9%, believed that they would
“increase the by-the-book behavior of other officers.”76
The potential behavioral benefits of BWCs fall into three distinct
categories: improving compliance with rules, decreasing incivility, and
reducing violence. Officers and civilians alike may be affected by all
three categories of behavioral change. With regard to improving
compliance, officers may be more likely to obey the rules that govern
their behavior, from the constitutional limitations on searches and
seizures to agency policies and procedures. Civilians, meanwhile, may
be more likely to obey state laws as well as officers’ directives. With
regard to decreasing incivility, it is hoped that officers and civilians
who are being recorded will be more polite to each other, improving
the character of police encounters. Finally, with regard to reducing
violence, the objective is to discourage resistance by civilians and
gratuitously severe or frequent uses of force by officers, especially in
the context of deadly force.
It is worth pointing out at the outset that although civilian
discourtesy, officer rudeness, civilian resistance, and police uses of
force are distinct, there are many cases in which they will be
interrelated, if not interdependent. Use-of-force scenarios only rarely
72. David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools
for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 359
(2010).
73. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
74. See generally Janne E. Gaub et al., Officer Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras
Before and After Deployment: A Study of Three Departments, 19 POLICE Q. 275 (2016)
(discussing police perceptions of BWCs).
75. Id. at 284.
76. Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and Cameras: Officer Perceptions of the Use of
Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549, 551 (2014).
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arise spontaneously. Police violence can, but typically does not, just
suddenly erupt. Instead, it is far more common for an officer’s use of
force to be the culmination of an encounter with multiple iterations, a
series of back-and-forth exchanges between the officer and the
civilian.77 Incivility on either side—or both sides—can contribute to
an officer’s use of force. For example, an officer may use force to
overcome civilian resistance that was provoked by the officer’s
rudeness. Or, to present the same idea chronologically, an officer’s
incivility can give rise to civilian resistance that an officer then
overcomes with force.78 In short, it is possible that an increase in
civility and professionalism will lead to a corresponding reduction in
resistance, which will lead to a reduction in police uses of force. It is
also possible that even without any impact on civility, the presence of
a body-worn camera can discourage resistance or, for that matter,
that BWCs could affect officers’ use-of-force decisions even if they
had no effect on civilian resistance.
There is some reason to believe that body-worn cameras do
influence civilian and officer behavior, although the results of
empirical studies are not consistent. A well-publicized, randomized,
controlled trial in Rialto, California, for example, found that the
adoption of body-cameras in the twelve-month evaluation period was
correlated with an approximately ninety percent reduction in the
number of complaints filed against officers and a roughly fifty percent
decrease in officer use-of-force incidents.79 Several observers have
also pointed to the much larger Oakland Police Department,80 which
saw a more than seventy percent decline in uses of force and a
similarly large decline in civilian complaints over the seven-year
period (2008 to 2015) during which it was working toward meeting the
requirements of a federal consent decree81 by, inter alia, rolling out

77. See GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE
USE OF FORCE: OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, & RECIPROCITY 41 (2004).
78. See Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops & Guardian Officers,
51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611, 652–58 (2016).
79. Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police BodyWorn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 510 (2014).
80. The Rialto Police Department employs approximately 100 sworn officers, while
the Oakland Police Department employs over 700 sworn officers. See id. at 518; CITY OF
OAKLAND CAL., AUGUST 2017 STAFFING REPORT, http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1
/groups/police/documents/agenda/oak067044.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4F6-4YEW].
81. See generally Settlement Agreement Re: Pattern and Practice Claims, Allen v.
City of Oakland, C00-4599 TEH (JL) (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2008) (requiring the department to
implement any procedures that would increase officer accountability).
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body-worn cameras for all patrol officers.82 Two pilot programs in
Scotland—one in Renfrewshire and the other in Aberdeen—
suggested that civilians are less likely to assault officers who are
wearing body-worn cameras.83 In late-2017, the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department released the results of a
randomized, controlled trial that found that cameras reduced officer
misconduct and the use of force.84
Not all of the studies support the conclusion that body cameras
will have the desired effects, however. Most recently, a randomized,
controlled trial at the Metropolitan Police Department in
Washington, DC, showed no statistically significant effect on officer
uses of force or civilian complaints.85 That study was rolled out in
multiple patrol districts over the course of eighteen months, although
the findings are based only on the first seven months of BWC
implementation.86 A prior thirty-month study at the Phoenix Police
Department, which included a review of the fifteen months prior to
implementation and the fifteen months after implementation, found
that body-worn cameras did not have any impact on civilian behavior
or the use of force.87 It did, however, find both a reduction in civilian

82. Mike Blasky, Oakland Police Becoming Example for Departments Seeking to
Reform, MERCURY NEWS (May 9, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/05/09
/oakland-police-becoming-example-for-departments-seeking-to-reform/ [https://perma.cc
/Q5SW-BLMC]. Importantly, the data from the Oakland Police Department is not the
result of a randomized, controlled trial. Id. It is highly likely that the other measures the
agency was taking pursuant to the consent decree also contributed to the decline in uses of
force.
83. ODS CONSULTING, BODY WORN VIDEO PROJECTS IN PAISLEY AND ABERDEEN
SELF EVALUATION 14 (2011).
84. ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS: NEW
FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED, CONTROLLED TRIAL AT THE LAS VEGAS
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 8–9 (2017), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf
/IRM-2017-U-016112-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R5S-D3XC].
85. Randomized Controlled Trial of the Metropolitan Police Department Body-Worn
Camera Program, THE LAB @ DC, http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZUU42VD6].
86. Id. The study examined whether BWCs changed behavior by comparing the
actions of officers who were wearing a BWC with those of officers who were not, but most
of the police encounters reviewed involved officers who had BWCs and officers who did
not. This is relevant because it may well be the case that the presence of a BWC on scene,
not the wearing of a BWC by a particular officer, affected officer behavior; testing for this
effect was not within the scope of the study.
87. CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER BODY WORN
CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2014) [hereinafter KATZ ET AL.,
EVALUATING THE IMPACT]; CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PHOENIX, ARIZONA, SMART POLICING INITIATIVE:
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS ii (2015)
[hereinafter KATZ ET AL., SMART POLICING INITIATIVE].
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complaints and an increase in discretionary arrests.88 The Edmonton
Police Service in Alberta, Canada conducted a three-year pilot
program and concluded that BWCs had no statistically significant
effect on officers’ use of force or civilian complaints.89 One multi-site
study suggested that officers wearing body cameras were more likely
to be assaulted by civilians than officers who were not so equipped,90
while a follow-up study suggested that the timing of when officers
begin recording or announce that they have begun recording may
have more of an effect than the mere presence or absence of a bodycamera.91
The conflicting findings make it imprudent to assume, at this
point, that body-worn cameras consistently affect civilian or officer
behavior, let alone that they do so in predictable ways. Perhaps more
importantly, to the extent that BWCs do affect civilian or officer
behavior, the various studies have not yet attempted to identify how.
That is, there is no empirical evidence as to the mechanism or
mechanisms through which body-worn cameras affect behavior.
There are at least four possibilities, which may very well work in
conjunction with each other: the observer effect, deterrence theory,
conformity, and experiential updating.
The observer effect, sometimes known as the bystander effect or
the Hawthorne effect, refers to the intuitive phenomenon that people
behave differently when they know they are being observed.92 In the
late 1920s and early 1930s, the Hawthorne Works factory in Illinois
commissioned a series of studies to determine how various factors—
including lighting levels, re-organized work stations, the availability of
food, the frequency of breaks, an obstacle-free workplace, and so

88. KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT, supra note 87, at 3; KATZ ET AL.,
SMART POLICING INITIATIVE, supra note 8787, at 7–8.
89. EDMONTON POLICE SERV., BODY WORN VIDEO: CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE
8 (2015), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Edmonton-Police-BWVFinal-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3Y3-AYPL].
90. Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and
Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13
EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744, 750 (2016).
91. Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of
Body-Worn Cameras Are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup
Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453, 461
(2016).
92. Ryan Olson et al., What We Teach Students About the Hawthorne Studies: A
Review of Content Within a Sample of Introductory I-O and OB Textbooks, 41 INDUS.ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST 23, 31 (2004) (citing JAMES L. BOWDITCH &
ANTHONY F. BUONO, A PRIMER ON ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 361 (5th ed. 2001)).
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on—affected employee productivity.93 The studies found that
changing almost any factor, including a reversion back to the original
conditions, resulted in an increase to productivity, at least for a period
of time.94 Later psychological research posited that the short-term
gains in productivity were not because of the changes to the working
environment, but rather because the employees were aware that they
were being closely monitored in the aftermath of those changes
because they received feedback about their productivity or because of
how employees interpreted the change in conditions.95 In the context
of policing, body-worn camera systems may change civilian and
officer behaviors by serving as a reminder that the behaviors in
question are—or may be—observed and evaluated.
But observation and evaluation need not be conducted by an
external party for the observer effect to come into play. Objective
Self-Awareness Theory posits that the likelihood that an individual
can and will alter her behavior is affected by her self-awareness.96
“Self-awareness . . . may be increased by any stimulus that draws a
person’s attention to himself, e.g., . . . the presence of a mirror or a
camera.”97 In some sense, the subject is both actor and observer. In
the 1970s, Charles Carver conducted a series of experiments designed
to test whether self-awareness could reduce aggression: subjects were
paired up, and one (the actual subject) was instructed to ask the other
(who was secretly a research assistant) several questions.98 For each
wrong answer, the actual subject was to deliver an electrical shock to
the other “subject.” The strength of the shock varied on a one to ten
point scale, and it was up to the actual subject to determine the level
of each shock. Carver found that the subjects who were in a room
with a mirror used less intense shocks than did subjects in a room
without a mirror. He concluded that the mirror increased selfawareness, which in turn reduced aggression.99 However, a separate
study suggested that it was not aggression itself that was affected, but
rather the subjects’ motivation to conform their behavior to what they

93. Id. at 26; see also John G. Adair, The Hawthorne Effect: A Reconsideration of the
Methodological Artifact, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 336 (1984).
94. Olson et al., supra note 92, at 26; Adair, supra note 93, at 336–37.
95. Adair, supra note 93, at 336–37, 342–43.
96. See Charles S. Carver, Physical Aggression as a Function of Objective SelfAwareness and Attitudes Toward Punishment, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510,
510 (1975); Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 91, 91
(1995).
97. Carver, supra note 96, at 510 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 512–13.
99. Id. at 516.
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perceived as expected.100 That study was similarly designed, but
subjects were informed that aggression was “positively valued,” or
normatively desirable.101 In that study, the subjects in a room with a
mirror delivered significantly higher shocks than did the subjects in a
room without a mirror.102 Both studies suggest that self-awareness can
increase the likelihood that the subjects will act in the way they
believe they are expected to act. When a civilian or officer perceives
that aggression is viewed negatively, the presence of a body-worn
camera may well reduce violence. But when they perceive that
aggression is a virtue, instead of a vice,103 the presence of a body-worn
camera may increase violence.
The preceding discussions, of course, suggest that an individual
must know that he are being observed or have some external
reminder that prompts his self-awareness. Police officers who
manually activate a body cam are likely in the best position to know
when a video recording is being made. Some cameras activate
automatically, but it is entirely plausible that officers and civilians
alike will, on at least some occasions, fail to perceive or fail to
understand any visible or audible signals that indicate that the camera
has begun recording. A study of civilians in Spokane, Washington, for
example, found that only twenty-eight of the people who interacted
with an officer equipped with a body-worn camera were aware of the
camera during the encounter.104
Further, given the relatively short shelf-life of the observer
effect—the improved productivity rates identified in the Hawthorne
Studies were found to return to near pre-intervention levels within
about eight weeks105—it is not clear that the observer effect will create
lasting changes to behavior even when all parties are aware that they
are being recorded. Data from the Spokane, Washington study
supports this hypothesis: a randomized, controlled trial found a thirty100. Id. at 510; Charles S. Carver, Facilitation of Physical Aggression Through
Objective Self-Awareness, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 365, 365 (1974).
101. Carver, supra note 100, at 365; see also id. at 367.
102. Id. at 367–68.
103. See, e.g., DAVE GROSSMAN & LOREN W. CHRISTENSEN, ON COMBAT: THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF DEADLY CONFLICT IN WAR AND IN PEACE 181
(2008) (discussing what the authors call “the gift of aggression”); see also Stoughton, supra
note 78, at 634–35, 652–58.
104. See, e.g., Michael D. White, Natalie Todak & Janne E. Gaub, Assessing Citizen
Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras After Encounters with Police, 40 POLICING: AN INT’L
J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 689, 693–94 (2017).
105. Richard E. Clark & Brenda M. Sugrue, Research on Instructional Media, 19781988, in INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 327, 328–33
(Gary J. Anglin ed., 1991).
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nine percent reduction in use of force incidents by officers equipped
with a BWC (compared to no reduction in the control group), but the
reductions disappeared after six months.106
Like the observer effect, deterrence theory suggests that officers
may adapt their behaviors because they know their actions are being
scrutinized. But where the observer effect may be predicated on selfawareness, deterrence theory posits that behavioral change may be
the result of a desire to avoid punishment.107 In this way, the effect of
body-worn cameras may be understood as an application of
situational crime prevention theory, which posits that crime can be
reduced by, inter alia, increasing the potential perpetrator’s
perception that she is likely to be identified and apprehended.108
Whether the potential perpetrator is a civilian who would otherwise
assault an officer or an officer who would otherwise treat a civilian
disrespectfully or use force gratuitously, the potential for bad actions
to be identified may discourage the actors from engaging in those bad
actions in the first place. According to Barak Ariel:
Effective deterrence is often thought of as a threat mechanism,
comprising five intertwined elements: A potential rule violator
must: (1) realize that the probability of apprehension . . . has
changed; (2) take these altered risks into account when deciding
whether to break the rule; (3) believe that there is a nonnegligible likelihood of being caught; (4) believe that any
altered penalty with will applied to him/her if caught; and (5) be
willing to alter choices in light of [the increased probability of
being apprehended].109
The presence of body-worn cameras may implicate deterrence theory
because video-recording technology increases the likelihood that
misconduct will be detected.110
The strength of the deterrence effect may very well be
contextual; some behaviors may be more or less susceptible to
deterrence based on the officer’s ability to prevent the probability of
106. Michael D. White, Janne E. Gaub & Natalie Todak, Exploring the Potential for
Body-Worn Cameras to Reduce Violence in Police-Citizen Encounters, 12 POLICING 66, 70
(2017).
107. Barak Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn
Cameras ‘Work’ or ‘Backfire’ in Aggressive Police-Public Encounters, 11 POLICING 1, 8–9
(2017).
108. Ronald Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 91, 106 (1995)
(describing “situational deterrence” as “increasing the risks of being caught).
109. Ariel et al., supra note 107, at 9 (citations omitted).
110. Id. (“The likelihood of getting caught for abusing powers, for instance, is
substantially elevated when the camera is recording the police–public interaction.”).
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detection and apprehension from changing. If officers adapt to the
presence of BWCs by, for example, deactivating a camera during a
civilian encounter, failing to activate the camera before a civilian
encounter, or failing to charge the camera batteries before shift, the
probability of apprehension has not increased.111 Indeed, relative to
the baseline of officers who are equipped with BWCs, the probability
of apprehension has decreased. This suggests the need for a secondorder application of deterrence theory: cameras may deter
misconduct, but only if officers are sufficiently deterred from
misusing (or not using) the cameras themselves.
Body-worn cameras may also promote behavioral changes in a
way that may be explained by the social psychological theory of
conformity. Social conformity, it is posited, pressures individuals to
adapt their behaviors to integrate into a group. In his now-famous
conformity experiments, Solomon Asch put a study subject in a line
with four other people who were described as other subjects, but who
were actually part of the experiment.112 The group of five people was
shown two cards and asked to match the line on Card 1 with one of
three lines of different lengths on Card 2. The experimenters
pretending to be study subjects all provided the same obviously
incorrect answer; the experiment was to see whether the actual study
subject would answer in kind. Asch found that more than a quarter of
the study subjects consistently agreed with the obviously incorrect
answer provided by the experimenters, and more than half did so at
least once.113 Later asked about their incorrect answers, the study
subjects explained that, after hearing the experimenters’ responses,
they either thought their initial (and correct) answer was wrong or
they knew the answer offered by the other “subjects” was wrong but
111. See, e.g., KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT, supra note 87, at 21 (finding
that most officers at the Phoenix Police Department did not activate their body-worn
cameras in situations that they were required by policy to record).
112. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure on the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN 177 (H. Guetzkow ed., 1951); Solomon
E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure on the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (Guy E. Swanson et al., ed., 1952) [hereinafter
Asch, Effects of Group Pressure]; Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193
SCI. AM. 31, 32 (1955); Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. &
APPLIED 1, 3–5 (1956) [hereinafter Asch, Studies of Independence].
113. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 112, at 2. A later meta-analysis of 133
similar studies from 17 countries found that conformity existed in all studies, but the level
of conformity depended on a range of factors including cultural norms relating to
collectivism or individualism. Rod Bond & Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A
Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 111, 111 (1996).
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they were afraid of being derided. Social psychologists identify these
two answers as references to informational conformity and normative
conformity.
Informational conformity refers to an individual’s acceptance of
evidence that has been provided or suggested by others.114 In the
Asch experiments, the subjects’ perception that the other study
participants had seen the line on Card 1 a certain way led them to
adopt that view as correct. In short, study subjects gave what they
believed was the correct answer, and they thought it was the correct
answer because the other “participants” had all provided it.
Normative conformity, sometimes called “social conformity,”
refers to an individual’s desire to fit in and willingness to adopt the
group perspective so as not to be judged as non-conforming by group
members.115 In other words, study subjects knowingly gave incorrect
answers to fit in with perceived group expectations.
Body-worn cameras have the potential to change officer
behavior through a combination of informational and normative
conformity. Officers already get a substantial amount of information
about how to do their jobs through the formal example set by
supervisors and training officers, the informal example set by their
more senior peers, and, to a lesser extent, from external sources such
as the courts and the federal government.116 To the extent that body
cameras can change officer behavior at all, it is possible that there
may be an initial change in the conclusions that officers draw about
the world—for example, whether a particular action by a suspect
justifies a use of force—and that initial change may, through the
process of informational conformity, spread from officer to officer,
especially from senior officers to junior officers.
Similarly, the implementation of a body-worn camera system
may lead officers to perceive that their colleagues expect them to
behave in a particular way—by, for example, reducing the frequency
or severity of uses of force. Normative conformity suggests that
officers may change their behaviors so as to be in accordance with
what they perceive as their colleagues’ expectations. This may explain
the results of the randomized, controlled trial at the Rialto, California
Police Department: different shifts were randomly assigned a camera,
so the same officer could be equipped with a camera on one shift, but

114. KNUD S. LARSEN, REIDAR OMMUNDSEN & KEES VAN DER VEER, BEING
HUMAN: RELATIONSHIPS AND YOU: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 253 (2015).
115. Id.
116. See Stoughton, supra note 78, at 641–51.
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then not given a camera on the next, and the study found a reduction
in the use of force among all officers (although the reduction among
officers when they were not wearing cameras was not as great as the
reduction among officers when they were wearing cameras).117
That finding may not be attributable to normative conformity, of
course; it may be the result of experiential updating, the utterly
mundane ability to learn from one’s experience and apply those
lessons to similar behavior in the future. To use a simplified example,
if a person has previously used only a hobby hammer—a smaller,
lightweight version of the standard hammer—to drive nails and then
one day uses a standard hammer and realizes how much easier it is,
that person’s experience allows him to update his approach to driving
nails: from that point on, he will choose to use a standard hammer. In
the context of policing, officers who have approached their job a
particular way may act differently shortly after being equipped with a
body camera (perhaps because of the observer effect or conformity).
If the officers learn that the changes improve their working lives by,
for example, making them more effective or safer, we might expect
them to retain some or all of those changes even after the dissipation
of the observer effect.
Body-worn cameras, it has been suggested, can improve policing
by increasing civility and decreasing both resistance by civilians and
the use of force by officers. Whether this prediction will bear fruit
may depend heavily on local factors well beyond the implementation
of a single piece of technology; the existing studies have shown mixed
results. The potential for body cameras to influence behavioral
change may depend on whether that change is driven by the observer
effect, conformity, experiential updating, or some combination of the
three.
C.

Informational Benefits

The final category of potential benefits relates to the ability of a
body-worn camera to provide more information than would
otherwise be available. This is particularly important in the context of
the often-brief encounters between police officers and civilians the
“quasi-events” marked by “the fleetingness and fluidity of power.”118
As Mary Fan has written, “more law enforcement encounters—
including some of the most opaque domains of criminal procedure—
117. Ariel et al., supra note 79, at 524–27.
118. Mat Coleman & Angela Stuesse, The Disappearing State and the Quasi-Event of
Immigration Control, 48 ANTIPODE 524, 527 (2016).
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will be illuminated.”119 Video footage, it is hoped, will not just provide
critical insight; it will allow us to draw reliable conclusions about
those previously shrouded interactions. As Howard Wasserman has
said, describing popular sentiment, “Video tells us exactly what
happened, entirely eliminates the he-said/he-said ambiguity that often
characterizes police-citizen encounters, and deters misbehavior by
police and citizens.”120 In short, body-worn camera systems will not
only provide comprehensive evidence, by providing more information
than currently exists, they will also provide accurate and objective
evidence.
In some ways this category is the most straight-forward. The
symbolic and behavioral benefits are attenuated from the BWC
hardware itself and require abstract sociological or psychological
theories to fully appreciate, but it takes no erudition or great
imagination to view BWCs as, well, cameras designed to record video.
In other ways, however, this category is the most fraught with
disagreement. That disagreement does not relate to the videorecording capacity of BWCs, but rather to the ultimate usage to which
the resulting video can or should be put. Although the range of
potential uses is likely as broad as human imagination, making any list
inherently incomplete, this Article offers a brief discussion of the
most common usages: officer accountability; individual investigations,
prosecutions, and defenses; aggregation and dragnet surveillance;
analytics and machine-learning; officer training, and news and
entertainment media.
Officer Accountability. Community members and officers alike
have an interest in officer accountability, although their perceptions
of current failures can be quite different. From the community
perspective, officers are too often improperly shielded from the
consequences of their errors and missteps by special procedural
protections in a system that has been coopted by powerful police
unions.121 A video recording of an encounter can both provide critical
evidence to supplement “official narratives, like sworn documents
created by police officers”122 and can provoke sufficient public
119. Fan, supra note 11, at 929.
120. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 832–33 (presenting exaggerated claims about body
cams as a foil).
121. Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185,
185–87 (2005); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200–02 (2016);
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1195–98 (2017).
122. Harris, supra note 72, at 359 (quoting Jim Dwyer, When Official Truth Collides
with Cheap Digital Technology, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1).
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interest to create political pressures for police agencies or political
subdivisions to take remedial or disciplinary actions. From the police
perspective, officers are too often improperly castigated for actions
that were entirely appropriate in the situation because of the media’s
obsession with negative portrayals of the police123 and public
ignorance about the harsh realities of policing.124 Further, video from
other sources, including bystanders, often fails to capture relevant
information, such as events that occurred prior to the initiation of
recording. Having more information about the nuances of an
individual encounter can protect officers from frivolous complaints
and give civilians some sense of situational empathy by illustrating the
pressures that officers face when making decisions in the field. From
both perspectives, additional video could potentially help recalibrate
the current flawed approach to officer accountability by providing
much-needed information.
Individual Investigations, Prosecutions, and Defenses. Video
footage could also be used to support a police investigation or the
ultimate prosecution of an individual civilian. The most obvious
scenario is a BWC video of an individual engaged in criminal activity,
but that is hardly the only possible example. By recording victim or
witness statements—particularly “good” statements by confident,
articulate witnesses or visibly emotionally distraught victims with
whom a jury is likely to sympathize—officers can collect valuable
evidence. Prosecutors can then use that evidence to bolster their
prosecutions with something more salient than a dry, written account
and more predictable than courtroom testimony. Similarly, a video
recording of the suspect’s interrogation—which is unusual in the field
even at police agencies that require or recommend recording stationhouse interviews—can be a powerful record of a damning confession.
Defense attorneys, on the other hand, can use BWC videos to identify
legal violations, such as failing to provide the Miranda warnings or
conducting unconstitutional searches. Further, defense attorneys may
use video evidence to raise questions about the underlying evidence
by highlighting discrepancies in witnesses’ statements or poor

123. John Gramlich & Kim Parker, Most Officers Say the Media Treat Police Unfairly,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/25/mostofficers-say-the-media-treat-police-unfairly/ [https://perma.cc/YCU5-WUDZ]. A Pew
Research Center survey, for example, found that eighty-one percent of officers either
agreed or strongly agreed that police are treated unfairly by the media. Id.
124. Stoughton, supra note 78, at 663.
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investigative procedures.125 Body-worn camera video of the crime
scene, the impoundment of evidence, the counting of seized currency,
the interrogation of the suspect, and other investigative steps can
provide documentation of what officers did and, even more
importantly, how they did it. Such a record is of obvious value: video
can serve as documentation of a good investigation and as a way to
identify and address shortcomings in a poor investigation. The
principal tactical value will go to officers and prosecutors, who have
the first opportunity to review BWC video. Well before a defense
attorney has access to the video, officers and prosecutors can use it to
determine how to best proceed with an investigation or prosecution.
Defense attorneys, meanwhile, will be able to use video to develop
their own case theories, and judges and juries’ fact-finding task may
be simplified by the presence of video evidence.
Aggregation & Dragnet Surveillance. Body-worn camera videos
will not just support specific investigations and prosecutions; they will
also allow for investigations and prosecutions that would not have
otherwise occurred. Hundreds or thousands of videos can be
aggregated and mined, reviewed manually by officers or, more
efficiently, by computer programs to develop information that may be
utterly unrelated to any ongoing criminal investigation or
prosecution.126 Running a stockpile of video through a facialrecognition program and social network analysis, for example, can
offer insights into an individual’s movements over time and the
identities of the people with whom the individual associates.127
Existing video from traffic cameras, stationary pole-cameras,
public/private security cameras, and the like already allow for such
analysis, of course, but from a very different perspective: long
distance and often from above, rather than close-range and from at or
relatively near eye level. Further, the transportability of body-worn
cameras means they can provide significantly more information
about, inter alia, the inside of a house or business, streets in
residential neighborhoods, backyards and enclosures, and so on. In
125. For example, a video may show officers conducting a shoddy interview by asking
leading questions that consciously or unconsciously contaminate the subject’s answers. See
BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 19–36 (2011).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough is Enough: Location Tracking,
Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 556, 564–65 (2014); Orin
S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 345 (2012).
127. E.g., Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do:
Facial Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy., 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 88, 89, 100, 104, 109–10 (2017).
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this way, body-worn cameras have the potential to not just add a few
extra data points to persistent surveillance but to dramatically expand
its scope. As technology becomes more sophisticated, with hardware
that allows for high-quality streaming and software that allows for
real-time facial recognition and behavioral analytics, BWCs may alert
officers when they detect an individual with an outstanding warrant
or an individual whom an algorithm determines is acting
suspiciously.128
Body-worn camera video can be used to facilitate machine
learning, in which massive amounts of data can be fed through a
software algorithm so that “computer systems learn about an
underlying process and its patterns by creating a useful mathematical
approximation of how the process works. This approximation can
then be applied to new data to predict future occurrences of the same
phenomena.”129 In the context of policing, technology companies are
using machine learning to develop automated editing tools.130 This
may prove particularly important in the policing context given the
need to redact at least some information from publicly-requested
police videos and the significant resources that manual redaction
requires. Redaction is hardly the only innovation that might come
from running BWC videos through machine-learning algorithms;
technologists could use them to train algorithms to identify, inter alia,
the frequency and nature of an officer’s on-duty activities (for officer
evaluation purposes), suspicious behavior,131 deception,132 rudeness133
or unprofessional conduct by officers, behaviors that predict a

128. There are, of course, a variety of potential problems with such usage, including the
invasion of privacy and the likelihood that algorithmic analysis can be contaminated by
human biases. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/KD8J-9579]; see also Fan, supra note 13, at 398; Henderson, supra note
13, at 937–38; Levinson-Waldman, supra note 13, at 889.
129. Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 875 (2016).
130. Neural Network for Video Editing, U.S. Patent Application No. 9,456,174, at 57
(filed Jan. 20, 2015) (describing “an automated video editing system”).
131. Rich, supra note 129, at 876.
132. See Verónica Pérez-Rosas et al., Deception Detection Using Real-Life Trial Data,
PROC. 2015 ACM ON INT’L CONF. ON MULTIMODAL INTERACTION 59, 59 (describing a
study which used a “multimodal deception detection system” to determine whether
statements made during testimony were truthful).
133. See Lisa Pearl & Mark Steyvers, “C’mon – You Should Read This”: Automatic
Identification of Tone from Language Text, 4 INT’L J. COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 12,
20–24 (2013) (studying machine learning techniques used to detect different tones,
including rudeness, from text).
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civilian’s impending flight from or violent assault of officers,134
behaviors indicative of mental illness or drug impairment,135 and so
on. Using the results of that machine learning could allow for the
integration of body-cameras, GPS systems, and police computeraided-dispatch systems.
Officers do not learn the same way that machine-learning
algorithms do, of course, but modern police training involves a
substantial number of videos. As a number of scholars have noted,
police training heavily prioritizes real world experience,136 and video
offers a rare window into which would-be officers can see what the
world is really like.137 One common theme can be found in “officer
survival” videos, which attempt to remind officers of the dangers of
complacency138 by showing officers being brutally attacked,139
disarmed,140 or killed. Indeed, it is the rare officer who has not seen
the video-recorded line-of-duty deaths of Laurens County, Georgia
Deputy Kyle Dinkheller141 or South Carolina Trooper Mark Coates.142
134. See PAUL K. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP. NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., USING
BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS TO HELP DETECT POTENTIAL VIOLENT ACTS: A REVIEW OF
THE SCIENCE BASE xiii–xiv (2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research
_reports/RR200/RR215/RAND_RR215.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR4T-2JNL] (describing a
study of recent and developing technologies used to “help detect potential violent
attacks”).
135. For example, officers can be trained as a “drug recognition expert[s]” who use a
standardized protocol to “recognize impairment in drivers under the influence of drugs
other than, or in addition to, alcohol.” Drug Recognition Experts (DRE), THE INT’L
DRUG EVALUATION & CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM, http://www.decp.org/drugrecognition-experts-dre/ [https://perma.cc/XMQ6-7FQ7].
136. DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS
SCIENCE 67 (2012); Seth Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 429, 456–60 (2015).
137. For example, in The Line of Duty, a police training company that started
producing and marketing VHS video training to police agencies in 1995 and today offers
“[o]ver 300 video courses covering virtually every aspect of law enforcement training” in a
large library of streaming, downloadable, and DVD videos. FAQs, IN THE LINE OF DUTY,
http://www.lineofduty.com/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/6P99-NHWT].
138. See SCOTT FIELDEN, THE MIND OF A COP: WHAT THEY DO AND WHY THEY DO
IT 21 (2009) (“If we have to use force to ensure our safety, we’re going to do so. That’s
why we won’t hesitate to come down on somebody like a ton of bricks in a tornado if we
need to.”).
139. Associated Press, Police: Officer Punched During Traffic Stop, YOUTUBE (Jul. 22,
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-eTcaF_6ILc.
140. PoliceOfficerSafety, Officer Disarmed During Arrest, YOUTUBE (Nov. 29, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tVjVCVDEYIY.
141. Deputy Dinkheller initiated a traffic stop and the motorist became belligerent and
aggressive. Ignoring Deputy Dinkheller’s repeated commands to the contrary, the
motorist reached back into his vehicle, drew a rifle, and ultimately shot Deputy Dinkheller
to death. See Thomas Lake, The Endless Death of Kyle Dinkheller: The Trigger and the
Choice, CNN (Aug. 2017), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/state/kyle-
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Videos are also used to debrief officers after critical incidents and to
train them for high-risk situations such as active shooters,143 armed
encounters,144 and so on.
Where the prior examples of potential informational benefits are
tightly related to policing itself, it is inevitable that news- and
entertainment-media sources will feature BWC video and thus
benefit from the additional information that BWCs can provide.
Indeed, they have already done so. As of November 2017, the first
page of a Google News search for “body-camera video” returned
links to various news outlets reporting on BWC video that showed,
inter alia, a Baltimore police officer verbally de-escalating a suicidal
man armed with a knife,145 a Los Angeles police officer allegedly
planting cocaine in a hit-and-run suspect’s wallet,146 a Cleveland
sergeant who was criminally charged for using excessive force,147 and

dinkheller-police-video/ [https://perma.cc/S3GL-37A5] (“Two decades later, a traffic stop
on a country road is still teaching police officers about deadly force—and the cost of
hesitation.”). This video is most often used to teach officers about the dangers of
hesitation.
142. Trooper Coates initiated a traffic stop and attempted to conduct a patdown of the
motorist when the motorist drew a handgun, shooting Trooper Coates. Trooper Coates
was able to use his radio to call for help, but his dispatcher and other officers did not know
where he had conducted the traffic stop. Jeff Brown, Corporal Mark Coates Shooting
(Fatal), YOUTUBE (May 27, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FraE77l4fI. This
video is most often used to teach officers about the need to inform dispatch of the location
of a stop before officers initiate the stop or interact with stopped subjects.
143. Most officers, I expect, have seen video from the 1997 armed robbery of a bank in
North Hollywood, California. Matthew Cipolla, The North Hollywood Shootout,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7dLeqEg6b8.
144. JustPoliceVideos, Kalamazoo, MI Police Respond to a Subject Openly Carrying
Rifle, YOUTUBE (Jun. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ap4reNEbyQ.
145. Kevin Rector, Body Camera Footage Shows Baltimore Police Officer De-Escalate
Standoff with Armed Man in Crisis, BALT. SUN (Nov. 8, 2017, 1:15 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-villaronga-video-20171108story.html [https://perma.cc/6LHL-7VPN].
146. Amy Powell, Attorney Says Body Cam Footage Shows LAPD Officer Planting
Cocaine, ABC7 (Nov. 10, 2017), http://abc7.com/attorney-says-body-cam-footage-showslapd-officer-planting-cocaine/2631384/ [https://perma.cc/4BL4-SHKK].
147. Adam Ferrise, Cleveland Police Officer Attacked Woman and Then Arrested Her
on False Charges, Court Records Say, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 5, 2017),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/10/cleveland_police_officer_charg_12.html
[https://perma.cc/4MLN-HYBP].
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fatal police shootings in Providence, Rhode Island;148 Santa Clara,
California;149 and Pueblo, Colorado.150
In sum, body-worn cameras offer agencies and communities alike
potential symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and informational
benefits.
III. PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS
I assume, dear reader, that there is some significant likelihood
that you would appreciate having more money. Have I got excellent
news for you! The potential benefits of winning the lottery are simply
tremendous, and the causal mechanism is almost laughably simple:
play the lottery, win the lottery, report your win, and collect your
earnings. In light of this startling, new information, I am confident
that you feel a strong, nigh overpowering, temptation to run right out
and buy yourself a lottery ticket. And yet, by virtue of the fact that
you are reading this sentence,151 I must assume that you have not
discarded this Article and run to the nearest store where lottery
products are sold.152 Why not? After all, I have clearly identified the
potential benefits of winning the lottery and the causal mechanism by
which those benefits can be realized! Perhaps it is because you are
aware of the immense practical challenges—namely, the nature of
probabilities—that limit your ability to win the lottery.
Part II identified the potential benefits that body-worn camera
systems may provide—symbolic benefits, behavioral benefits, and
informational benefits—but, as the preceding paragraph makes clear,
identifying the potential benefits and describing the causal
mechanisms is only the beginning of the analysis. Whether it is fair to
expect that any of the potential benefits can or will be realized
requires additional consideration, assuming there is video available in
148. Amanda Milkovits & Jacqueline Tempera, Providence Police Defend Shooting
that Killed Pickup Truck Driver, Injured Passenger, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (Nov. 10,
2017, 8:52 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20171110/providence-policedefend-shooting-that-killed-pickup-truck-driver-injured-passenger [https://perma.cc/R5L4
-VC7S].
149. Lisa Fernandez, Body Camera Video Released in Fatal Santa Clara Shooting of 24Year-Old Man, KTVU (Nov. 3, 2017, 12:55 PM), http://www.ktvu.com/news/body-cameravideo-released-in-fatal-santa-clara-shooting-of-24-year-old-man [https://perma.cc/JT57-82CG].
150. Chhun Sun, Watch: Pueblo Police Release Video of Fatal Officer-Involved
Shooting, GAZETTE (Nov. 8, 2017), http://gazette.com/watch-pueblo-police-release-videoof-fatal-officer-involved-shooting/article/1614856 [https://perma.cc/GQ9G-EGNL].
151. And apparently even reading this footnote.
152. I acknowledge, of course, that you may very well have done exactly that before
returning to finish this Article. I would applaud such diligence, although the probability
that my applause is called for seems vanishingly small.
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the first place.153 This Part explores some of the practical limitations
of body-worn camera technology and of our ability to use that
technology. The following Part addresses the policy considerations
that can affect whether BWCs live up to their potential benefits.
A. Limits of Technology
Body-worn cameras are merely another variety of camera, and
thus they suffer from the same limitations that we have known about
since Nicéphore Niépce first projected an image onto a piece of paper
coated with silver chloride some 200 years ago.154 First and most
prominently, there must be sufficient infrastructure to ensure that the
relevant officers are equipped with cameras and that the relevant
audiences can access the resulting footage of those interactions. The
dominant approach at police agencies has been to equip patrol
officers with body-worn cameras: by December 2017, for example, the
Chicago Police Department had equipped every officer in its twentyfive patrol districts with a BWC.155 That makes sense; the patrol
function is typically the single largest division in most agencies,
employing between sixty percent and ninety percent of sworn officers,
and typically it is patrol officers who are most salient when it comes to
solving crimes.156 But patrol officers are hardly the only officers who
interact with community members in potentially problematic ways;
the behavioral and informational benefits of a body-worn camera
system will be incomplete if other officers are not similarly equipped.
At the Chicago Police Department, which is admittedly much larger
than the average police agency, officers assigned to the Canine Unit,
the Traffic Section, SWAT, Public Transportation, and the Troubled
153. See infra Section IV.A.
154. HELMUT GERNSHEIM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 9 (3d ed. 1986).
155. Michelle Gallardo & Cate Cauguiran, All Chicago Police Patrol Officers Now
Equipped with Body Cameras, Department Says, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Dec. 10,
2017), http://abc7chicago.com/all-cpd-patrol-officers-now-equipped-with-body-cameras/2764478/
[https://perma.cc/ZJ8S-UUSN] (“Chicago now has the largest deployment of body
cameras in the nation. . . . In total, more than 7,000 Chicago police personnel are now
equipped with body cameras.”); see also Ryan Dunn, Body Camera Issued to Each Patrol
Officer at Toledo Police Department, THE BLADE (Oct. 20, 2017),
http://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2017/10/20/Body-camera-issued-to-each-patrolofficer-at-Toledo-Police-Department.html [https://perma.cc/7VCE-BUMD] (explaining a
similar plan for patrol officers in Toledo, Ohio); Mark Wilson, Austin Officers Who Patrol
Neighborhoods to Get Body Cameras Soon, MYSTATESMAN (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:41 PM),
http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local-govt--politics/austin-officers-who-patrol-neighborhoods
-get-body-cameras-soon/tgcx33iP9pUjq2CW1lgD3I/
[https://perma.cc/88NU-WKML]
(explaining that the Austin, Texas Police Department will soon “roll out its first large
batch of body cameras for officers working outside of downtown”).
156. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 878–79 (2014).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1363 (2018)

2018]

POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS

1401

Buildings Unit fall under the Bureau of Patrol but are not assigned to
one of the twenty-five patrol districts.157 Meanwhile, officers who
investigate property crimes, violent crimes, and youth investigations
and officers working in the Fugitive Apprehension Unit, the Major
Auto Theft Investigation Unit, and the Violent Crimes Task Force
are operationally in the Bureau of Detectives, which is not scheduled
to receive body-worn cameras,158 nor are officers who work in the
Narcotics Division, the Gang Investigations Division, or the Vice and
Asset Forfeiture Division, which are organized under the Bureau of
Organized Crime.159 In short, the first infrastructure problem arises
from the difficult problem of equipping all officers, investigators, and
detectives who regularly interact with the public by, inter alia,
initiating stops, making arrests, and conducting interviews. The
benefits that may accrue from equipping specialized units must be
weighed against the unique challenges that doing so would entail.160
Similarly, a majority of agencies allow their officers to work in a
police capacity for private employers while off-duty;161 if these officers
are not equipped with or required to wear BWCs,162 that absence can
limit the behavioral and informational benefits of having the
technology. Simply put, if officers are not wearing the cameras while
they are working in a uniformed-police capacity—even if that work is
performed for the private employer—cameras cannot record their

157. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW: BUREAU OF PATROL,
attachment 4 (2017), https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/org-forcommand-DRAFT-87-CW-revisions-to-Forensic-Services-Division-15AUG17-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DF39-F3LV].
158. Id. at attachment 5.
159. Id.
160. See JANNE E. GAUB, NATALIE TODAK & MICHAEL D. WHITE, BEYOND
PATROL: EXPLORING THE PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS AMONG
OFFICERS IN SPECIALIZED UNITS III (2017), https://www.bwctta.com/sites/default/files
/Files/Resources/Specialty%20Unit%20Report%20Final%202-17_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZYG5-VZD3] (“BWCs may not be appropriate for certain specialized units, and
Department leadership should carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
deployment for each unit.”).
161. See Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The Private Employment of Off-Duty
Officers, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1849–50 (2017) (explaining that agencies often
encourage moonlighting, which “increase[s] police visibility in the community” and
“supplements agency staffing”).
162. AP Exclusive: Moonlighting Police Leave Body Cameras Behind, ABC NEWS
(Jun.
11,
2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/amp/Technology/wireStory/ap-exclusivemoonlighting-police-leave-body-cameras-home-47965683 [https://perma.cc/86ZV-MQT7];
see also POLICING PROJECT, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, NYPD Body-Worn Camera
Proposed Policy: Fact Sheet, POLICINGPROJECT.ORG https://policingproject.org/nypdbody-worn-camera-proposed-policy-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/UJ79-HLB9] (summarizing
the NYPD body-cam policy without mention to any off-duty protocol).
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interactions and are unlikely to exert any influence on behavior.
Worse, the failure to equip officers with BWCs can undermine the
symbolic benefits by leading community members to conclude, even
unfairly, that the agency’s efforts were superficial and not seriously
intended to improve transparency and accountability.
On the other side of the camera, inadequate infrastructure—that
is, insufficient time and resources—can preclude everyone who needs
to see the video to achieve the desired benefits from being able to do
so. A supervisor cannot effectively use BWC videos to more closely
monitor the officers on her squad if, for example, the current
demands on her time are already so burdensome as to limit or
preclude her from reviewing the videos. Beyond police supervisors,
several aspects of the potential informational benefits require
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to be able to access video
recordings. Several manufacturers record video in proprietary file
formats, which either require special software to review or which
must be manually exported in a different format, marginally reducing
availability.163 Finally, internet-based video management systems,
such as Axon’s (formerly known as TASER International)
Evidence.com, require viewers to accept “Terms and Conditions”
before viewing the video; several defense attorneys have refused to
do so, arguing that such an arrangement “effectively requires users to
sign away some of their legal rights in exchange for receiving public
records” that they have a right to obtain and review.164 In short, if
cameras are not where we need them to be and the relevant entities
cannot or will not review the footage, the technology is unlikely to
fulfill the full extent of the potential benefits.
Even when there is video footage from the proper person to
review and the proper person actually reviews it, a body-worn camera
still suffers from unavoidable practical limitations. Most obviously,
someone can obscure the object from the camera: an officer’s arm
may get in the way or a drop of rain on the exterior of the lens may
distort the image. Just as importantly, however, is the camera’s
limited field of view, meaning the extent of the visible image. An
officer’s BWC will never capture the details of that officer’s
163. SAVER PROGRAM, SCI. AND TECH. DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., BODY-WORN VIDEO CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT MARKET SURVEY
REPORT 2–3 (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Body-Worn-CamsMSR_0615-508_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RZU-2JP5].
164. Janus Kopfstein, Police Body Camera Giant Made Lawyers Sign Away Client
Footage, VOCATIVE (May 12, 2017 3:53 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/429096/police-bodycamera-taser-axon-made-lawyers-sign-away-client-footage/index.html
[https://perma.cc
/RG9L-VLQD].
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behavior—their stance, body language, and specific movements—
simply because the camera is outward looking. In cases where it is
important to know, for example, exactly when an officer drew their
baton or raised it up to strike, the officer’s BWC footage simply will
not help answer that question.
Further, a camera’s field of view is narrower than of the human
eye. The human eye has, in most cases, a rather large horizontal field
of view. To test this, put your arms straight out in front of you and
start wiggling your fingers. Keeping your eyes focused straight ahead,
slowly open your arms while you continue to wiggle your fingers. Stop
opening your arms when you can just barely see your fingers moving
out of the corners of your eyes. Most people will find that they have
opened their arms somewhere between 170° and 200°. Cameras have
substantially more restricted fields of view. The Axon Body 2 has one
of the widest available horizontal fields-of-view at 143°.165 The Vievu
LE3 body-worn camera, in contrast, has a 68° diagonal field of
view.166
At the same time, however, a camera’s effective field of view is
actually wider than that of the human eye. Everything that appears
within the camera’s field of view is in focus, but human vision is more
limited. Our central angle of view is 40–60°, and the field of sharp
visual acuity, known as fovea or foveal vision after the fovea centralis,
gives us only about two degrees of sharp focus.167 To “see” objects
that do not fit within foveal vision, we must move our eyes around the
image so that our brain can stitch together the different pieces we
have put in our fovea.168 To demonstrate this, stand about arm’s
length from someone and ask him to describe your face; watch his
eyes and you will see them shifting back and forth as he moves his
foveal vision around your face. Cameras, however, have no such
limitations. In short, sometimes officers will see things that the
camera does not (as when the camera is pointed straight ahead and
the officer sees something at the edge of their vision) and sometimes
the camera will see things that the officer does not (as when the
165. AXON Body 2, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/body-2 [https://perma.cc
/QD47-HY3A].
166. Body Camera Comparison: A Look at Camera Specs Side-by-Side, MIAMI
VALLEY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, http://www.mvrma.com/pdfs/BWC
%20comparison%20chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZR4-7MKA].
167. Robert P. O’Shea, Thumb’s Rule Tested: Visual Angle of Thumb’s Width is About
2 Degrees, 20 PERCEPTION 415, 415 (1991).
168. Alex Burmester, How Do Our Brains Reconstruct the Visual World? THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 5, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-do-our-brainsreconstruct-the-visual-world-49276 [https://perma.cc/S2QB-6ZEG].
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officer’s vision is focused on a subject’s right hand but the camera can
see both hands).
Field of view can also affect the viewer’s perception of distance.
Imagine two cameras set up the same distance from a person. In the
video from the camera with the narrower field of view, the person will
appear closer than he does in the video from the camera with the
wider field of view. And both will look different than if you placed
your eyes where the cameras were located. Anyone who has
attempted to photograph something only to be disappointed in how
small the object turns out in the picture has seen firsthand an
everyday example of the difference between her own field of view
and a camera’s.
Digital video recording technology also presents some practical
limitations on informational benefits of body-worn cameras. Consider
a high-definition image with a resolution of 1920 by 1080, or 1920
pixels horizontally by 1080 pixels vertically, for a grand total of
2,073,600 pixels. Video is nothing more than a series of still images
recorded in sequence and played back at a high enough rate—known
as the “frame rate”—that our brains see movement and motion. With
a standard twenty-four-frame rate video, then, there are twenty-four
separate images in each second of video, which means that one
second of video made up of separate digital images (known as “raw”
video) would have 49,766,400 pixels.169 For many devices, that would
be memory-prohibitive: it would simply take more electronic space
than most devices have. The solution is compression of digital video,
which one article refers to as “the art of throwing as much data away
as possible without it showing.”170 The article explains:
By the end of the 1990s, the dominant techniques were based
on a three-stage algorithm known as DCT (Discrete Cosine
Transform). DCT uses the fact that adjacent pixels in a picture
– either physically close in the image (spatial) or in successive
images (temporal) – may be the same value. A mathematical
transform . . . is performed on grids of 8×8 pixels (hence the
blocks of visual artefacts at high compression levels). It doesn’t
reduce data but the resulting coefficient frequency values are
no longer equal in their information-carrying roles. Specifically,
it’s been shown that for visual systems, the lower frequency
components are more important than high frequency ones. A
169. Ryan Knott, Frame Rate: A Beginner’s Guide, TECHSMITH (March 28, 2017),
https://www.techsmith.com/blog/frame-rate-beginners-guide/ [https://perma.cc/HE5Z-V5K6].
170. Digital Video Compression, PCTECHGUIDE, https://www.pctechguide.com/digitalvideo/digital-video-compression [https://perma.cc/48H4-99HE].
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quantisation process weights these accordingly and ejects those
contributing least visual information, depending on the
compression level required.171
In layman’s terms, the software applies a “codec” that reviews
the separate still images in each frame and looks for small pieces of
the image that are similar to each other. If the pieces are sufficiently
similar, the software discards one of them and keeps the other,
displaying it in both frames. The codec repeats this for the next frame
of the image in which it detects no changes or only changes that it
believes would not be visible to the human eye.172 In short, a
compressed recording from a digital-video camera, including a BWC,
is not a reflection of still pictures taken every 1/24th of a second and
then put together; instead, it is a collection of pieces of still pictures
that are reassembled according to the instructions in the codec. The
quality of the codec, then, can affect whether compressed video is an
accurate reflection of what it recorded.
Body-worn cameras can provide informational benefits, but
those benefits are only as good as the practical limitations of the
hardware allow. Despite the superficial similarities, BWCs are not
just another source of visual and auditory information akin to human
eyes and ears. Even a head-mounted camera will not provide an
officer’s-eye view of the situation, to say nothing of and shoulder or
chest-mounted cameras, and the human eye cannot see the infra-red
spectrum the way some cameras can. In short, BWCs will record less,
more, and differently than a human would see, all at the same time.
B.

Limits of Human Interpretation

The potential for body-worn cameras to have informational
benefits assumes that viewers will be able to accurately interpret the
recorded videos, but just as digital cameras have inherent limitations,
so too do their users. We all suffer from a range of cognitive
limitations that can affect our ability to interpret evidence, including
video footages. Cognitive biases are, in essence, mental frameworks
that help us analyze the otherwise overwhelming flood of information
that we perceive in every conscious moment. Without our ever being
aware of it, our brains seek to reduce the amount of effort that
processing information requires by filtering current perceptions
through the lenses of previous experience, identity, and expectation,
171. Id.
172. For an easy to follow explanation of this concept, see David Shelburne, Digital
Video Compression, YOUTUBE (Mar. 16, 2014), https://youtu.be/nOo3SCihTZI?t=116.
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drawing associations between certain observations and predicted
outcomes or possibilities.173
One such cognitive bias is motivated reasoning, defined as “the
tendency of people to conform [their] assessments of information to
some goal or end [other than] accuracy.”174 When evaluating
information, legal scholar and psychologist Dan Kahan explains,
[t]he goal of protecting one’s identity or standing in an affinity
group that shares fundamental values can generate motivated
cognition relating to policy-relevant facts . . . . If a proposition
about some policy-relevant fact comes to be commonly
associated with membership in such a group, the prospect that
one might form a contrary position can threaten one’s standing
within it.175
Relatedly, the tendency to interpret information in a way that
confirms one’s preexisting worldview or beliefs—what Kahan calls
“identity-affirmation” or “identity-protective cognition”176—also
affects the way we see the world. Together, motivated reasoning and
identity confirmation bias can lead us to unconsciously interpret
evidence, including video, so that we see what we expect and want to
see.
In the policing context, a study by YouGov can serve as an
example of motivated reasoning and confirmation bias in perceptions
of police officer and subject honesty. Respondents were given a
hypothetical situation in which a police officer has arrested a
suspected criminal and “both are complaining that they have been
assaulted by the other.”177 Respondents were asked who was most
likely to be telling the truth. Among white respondents, 44% believed
the officer was most likely telling the truth, 29% believed they were
equally likely to be telling the truth, and 7% believed the suspect was
most likely telling the truth.178 Among black respondents, only 4%

173. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux
eds., 2011) (describing the dual process theory of human cognition, comprised of “System
1” thinking, which consists of subconscious reflexive assessments and responses to sudden
stimuli and “System 2” thinking, which is marked by conscious deliberation or the use of
logic).
174. Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013).
175. Id.
176. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006).
177. Reveal Public Survey on Body Worn Cameras, YOUGOV, PLC (Sept. 2015) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
178. Id.
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thought the officer was likely to be telling the truth, 41% thought they
were equally likely to be telling the truth, and 20% thought the
suspect was likely to be telling the truth.179 Respondents lacked any
reliable information upon which to base their conclusions about the
officer’s and suspect’s honesty, so their perceptions were shaped
instead by their own identities and expectations. The results are
consistent with the findings of well-known studies finding that whites
and blacks report very different levels of confidence in the police.180
The same phenomenon plays out when individuals watch videos;
their perceptions of the video will be affected by their prior attitudes
toward the police.181 I worked with The New York Times to develop
an interactive feature that involved viewers identifying their
perception of police and interpreting a series of ambiguous videos.
The methodology was not scientifically rigorous—some questions had
55,000 responses while some had more than 77,000 responses, viewers
could submit responses multiple times, and there was no way to
control the environment in which viewers watched the video or
whether a previous viewer shared information about the video with a
future viewer—but the results were nevertheless notable. After
watching a video of an officer who approaches a vehicle and then falls
to the ground as the driver exists the vehicle, viewers were asked
whether they saw a “serious threat” to the officer: a serious threat was
reported by twenty-eight percent of individuals who indicated that
they generally trust the police, but only by nineteen percent of the
individuals who indicated that they generally distrust the police.182
In a much more rigorous study, Roseanna Sommers tested study
participants by first evaluating whether they identified with the police
(“high identifiers”) and then determining whether that identification
affected their evaluation of videos from three police interactions.183
Study participants were asked about the facts of each video, whether
the officer was fair, and whether the officer’s actions were

179. Id.
180. See, e.g., RICH MORIN & RENEE STEPLER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE RACIAL
CONFIDENCE GAP IN POLICE PERFORMANCE 3 (2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-gap-in-police-performance/ [https://perma.cc/4L9S-66L6].
181. See Roseanna Sommers, Developments in the Law—Policing: Considering Police
Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1812–14 (2015) (discussing the questionable
objectivity of body-camera video).
182. Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html
[https://perma.cc/L2AU-AWG5].
183. Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Body Cameras on Police Reduce
Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1318–22 (2016).
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appropriate.184 She found that “viewers’ prior attitudes toward the
police color their interpretations of the events caught on tape.”185
Specifically,
[f]or factual judgments, across all three videos, respondents
who strongly identified with police were more likely to find
facts favoring the police. In other words, high identifiers were
less likely to agree that the officer displayed or used weapons,
that the officer used insulting language, or that the citizen
complied with the officer’s requests. A similar pattern was
observed for fairness judgments, the second outcome variable.
Across all three videos, high identifiers thought the police
officer acted more fairly and respectfully than did low
identifiers. On the third outcome variable—global judgments—
the same pattern was again observed. High identifiers were
more likely than low identifiers to find that the police officer
acted appropriately and lawfully. They were less likely to
believe that the police officer deserved punishment.186
Even more importantly, Sommers found that video was about as
susceptible to motivated reasoning as other forms of evidence,
leading her to conclude that “video evidence is not worse than other
types of testimony, but whether it is superior to the alternatives
remains an open question.”187 However, she notes, individuals who
saw video are more certain that their conclusions are correct than
individuals who reviewed other forms of evidence: “When we
compare the responses of participants given video and nonvideo
testimony, we find that those who saw the videos and already
identified with the police were more likely to express certitude in
their judgment that the officer had acted reasonably or
unreasonably.”188
Beyond our own general tendency to view (video) evidence in a
way that confirms our preexisting worldview, there are specific biases
that can limit our ability to draw accurate conclusions from video.
One such cognitive limitation is “camera perspective bias,”
illuminated in the interrogation context by Daniel Lassiter and his coauthors. In their study, actors reenacted a police interrogation that
was recorded in five different ways: there was a written transcript, an
audio recording, a video recording taken from over the detective’s
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1322–23.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346.
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shoulder and focused on the suspect (the “suspect-focus” camera), a
video recording taken from over the suspect’s shoulder and focused
on the detective (the “detective-focus” camera), and a video
recording taken from a high vantage point with both the detective and
the suspect in the frame (the “equal-focus” camera).189 Study
participants were assigned to view one of the five records of the
interrogation and to evaluate how coercive or voluntary the suspect’s
ultimate confession was. The participants who read the transcript,
listened to the audio recording, or watched the equal-focus video
reported roughly equal levels of coercion and voluntariness, but not
so with the other two groups of participants.190 The participants who
watched the suspect-focus video reported a higher degree of
voluntariness and a lower degree of coercion than the transcript,
audio recording, and equal-focus groups, while the participants who
watched the detective focus video reported a lower degree of
voluntariness and a higher degree of coercion.191 The result
demonstrates a cognitive psychology concept of “illusory causation,”
which refers to people’s tendency to “overattribute causality to a
given stimulus when it is salient or the focus of their attention.”192 In
short, the participants who watched the suspect-focus video
overestimated the extent to which the suspect was the cause of the
confession because the suspect dominated the video they watched,
while the participants who watched the detective-focus video did
exactly the same with the detective. In later studies, Lassiter
concluded that “people’s literal point of view affects how they initially
perceive, or extract, information from an observed interaction, which
in turn affects their judgments regarding the causal influence exerted
by each interactant.”193
Illusory causation has obvious implications for the potential for
body-worn cameras to provide informational benefits. The various
manufacturers of BWCs make a variety of models that officers can
wear on their heads, shoulders/lapels, or chests, but as noted above,
all of them are outward facing. Viewing recorded interactions through
that keyhole will lead watchers to overattribute causality to the
189. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in
Videotaped Confessions, 1 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 53, 54–55 (2001); see G.
Daniel Lassiter et al., The Potential for Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 22 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1843 (1992) [hereinafter Lassiter, Potential for Bias].
190. Id. at 1847–48.
191. Id.
192. G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Illusory Causation: Why it Occurs, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 299,
299 (2002).
193. Id.
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individuals with whom the officer is interacting. That tendency is
problematic not just in the context of confessions, but also when
viewers are being asked to determine the validity of a subject’s
consent to an officer’s request to stop and chat or to search, the
events that precipitated a subject’s flight or an officer’s use of force,
and so on. Camera-perspective bias may suggest that officers are
passive observers, merely reacting to the individuals they encounter,
when that is not the case.
Interpretation of video is also subject to misinterpretation
because of a phenomenon I have come to call “deceptive intensity,”
which refers to our tendency to overestimate the amount and speed of
movement, and thus the intensity of the action, in body-worn camera
footage. Deceptive intensity results from a confluence of the camera’s
location, the way BWCs move, and the way we perceive motion. With
regard to the camera’s location, Hollywood directors have known for
years that positioning the camera underneath the subject so the
upward angle of the show exaggerates the subject’s height and the
breadth of their shoulders. A shoulder- or chest-mounted camera will
duplicate that effect, particularly when officers are physically close to
the subject being recorded. To see why, stand within arm’s reach of
someone roughly your height and lock eyes with them. Maintain eye
contact and, while they remain standing, bend your knees until your
eyes are roughly even with their chest (and where your chest had
been when you were standing upright). The person in front of you will
look substantially taller and may appear broader, and thus more
intimidating. Further, as fear increases, our perception of distance
changes; threatening individuals appear closer to us than nonthreatening individuals.194 And, of course, an individual who is too
close to the camera will effectively block out the image entirely,
leaving viewers to base their interpretations of events on the recorded
sounds of the interaction.
Deceptive intensity also results from the exaggerated movement
of the camera itself. Body-worn cameras clip onto glasses, hats,
headbands, lapels, or shirts; even those that clip into mounts secured
behind shirts or in bullet-proof vests are attached to clothing.
Whatever the body-worn camera attaches to, it is not so tightly
connected to an officer’s body that it will mimic exactly her
movements. Instead, it will bounce around, thrown about by the sway
of an officer’s head or the jostling of an officer’s chest.
194. Shana Cole et al., Affective Signals of Threat Produce Perceived Proximity, 24
PSYCHOL. SCI. 34, 35 (2013).
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Because of the way our brain interprets motions, however, we
are unable to cognitively compensate for the exaggerated movement
when we watch BWC video. The inner ear gives us our vestibular
sense of body movement and balance, while proprioceptors in our
muscles and joints give us a sense of proprioception, or where our
body parts are.195 These senses are reason that you are not generally
dizzy when you wake up in a horizontal position and why you do not
have to look for your hands; without any conscious activity on your
part, your brain knows what position you are laying in and where
your body parts are.196 When you open your eyes, they provide
additional data that your brain uses to calibrate your position and
balance.197 Your eyes are subject to the vestibulo-ocular reflex, which
stabilizes your retina by moving your eyeballs slightly slower than you
move your head.198 Further, your brain engages in visual saccadic
suppression; in the split second that your eyes are actually moving,
your brain interrupts visual processing—you are temporarily blind
without ever being aware of it.199 This can be easily demonstrated by
standing in front of a mirror and looking from one eye to the other;
saccadic masking makes it impossible for you to ever see your own
eye movements.
Your brain takes in and processes a massive amount of
information to interpret movement and compensate for that
movement as it processes visual signals, but that information is simply
missing when you watch a video. Because we are not “in” the
movement, we cannot feel the movement, and because it is not our
bodies, eyes, and brains experiencing and recording the movements,
the images are not steadied by the vestibulo-ocular reflex and
saccadic masking. As a result, the movements can appear dramatically
exaggerated. To see this for yourself, start recording a video on your
smart phone and place the phone on your forehead so the camera is
facing in the same direction that you are looking. Fix your eyes on
something in front of you; keeping your eyes focused on whatever
you selected and keep your phone firmly against your forehead. Now
195. Human Vestibular System in Space, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Feb.
26, 2004), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/9-12/features/F_Human_Vestibular
_System_in_Space.html [https://perma.cc/8MGP-LAFM].
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Michael Fetter, Vestibulo-Ocular Reflex, in 40 NEURO-OPTHALMOLOGY:
NEURONAL CONTROL OF EYE MOVEMENTS 35 (A. Straube & U. Büttner eds., 2007).
199. Bruno G. Breitmeyer & Leo Ganz, Implications of Sustained and Transient
Channels for Theories of Visual Pattern Masking, Saccadic Suppression, and Information
Processing, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 26 (1976).
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use the tip of your nose to spell your full name in the air as quickly as
you can. When you finish, remove the phone from your forehead and
stop recording. Did you have any trouble keeping your eyes focused
on the object you were looking at? No, almost certainly not. Now
watch the video; the object you had no trouble keeping in focus is
probably jumping in and out of the frame, whipping around like mad.
Could someone who watched the video without any prior knowledge
of how it was filmed conclude that you were sitting or standing calmly
and wiggling your nose in the air?
I demonstrate the application of this phenomenon in the police
context using a video of a simulated foot pursuit in which I play the
role of an officer, wearing a Bodycam brand BWC, chasing a fleeing
suspect played by one of my students. The link to the video is in the
footnote;200 I urge readers to view the video and to evaluate each
separate section—body-worn camera video of the foot pursuit
without audio, body-worn camera video of the foot pursuit with
audio, and a bystander’s video of the foot pursuit—on a scale from
one (a normal walking pace) to ten (Usain Bolt sprinting downhill
with a tailwind). Is your perception of the speed of the foot pursuit
from the BWC video faster or slower than your perception of speed
in the bystander’s video?
At this point, one might be forgiven for assuming that our
interpretation of video would be more accurate if viewers had more
time to process the recorded events. That assumption, though, is not
borne out by the evidence. Not only is there no evidence to suggest
that slowing the video down will allow for an improved interpretation
of movement, but work published last year in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences suggest that a “slow motion
intentionality bias” leaves us ill-equipped to properly interpret slowmotion video.201 In a series of eight different experiments, Eugene
Caruso asked study participants to review a video of a real-world
incident—either a murder or a violent contact in professional
football—and evaluate the extent to which the actor intended their
actions.202 Some study participants were shown a full-speed video,
while others were shown a slow-motion video.203 Unsurprisingly, the
participants who reviewed the slow-motion video reported that the
200. SethS, BWC Interpretation: Foot Pursuit, YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_x9_DrwoNU&feature=youtu.be.
201. Eugene M. Caruso et al., Slow Motion Increases Perceived Intent, 113
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9250, 9250 (2016).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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actor acted with a higher degree of intent and deliberation than did
the participants who watched the regular speed video.204 What is
surprising, however, is that participants reported similar results even
when they were informed, by way of a timer in the video, exactly how
much the video had been slowed.205 And, perhaps most surprising of
all, viewers who watched a slow-motion video continued to report a
higher degree of intent even after they watched the regular speed
video: “allowing viewers to see both regular speed and slow motion
replay mitigates the bias, but does not eliminate it.”206
These biases may be even more troubling given our propensity to
be highly confident in our own conclusions, a tendency that may be
artificially bolstered even further when our conclusions are based on
our review of video evidence.207 Watching a video of an event does
not make us an eye witness to the event, despite our inclinations to
the contrary. This can be particularly problematic in the legal context;
as Erwin Chemerinsky has written, “[I]t is deeply troubling when an
appellate court, acting on its own, watches a tape and decides the
facts of a case for itself.”208 The same may be true in an administrative
review of an officer’s actions; the relevant question is often whether
an officer’s perceptions are reasonable, not whether they are
accurate.209 Properly reviewing an officer’s use of force, for example,
requires treating the officer as the initial finder of fact and reviewing
their findings (that is, their perceptions) to determine whether they
were reasonable under the circumstances.210 The risk of a reviewer
interjecting themselves as a witness is exacerbated further by
cognitive illiberalism, the risk that believing that our own perceptions
and conclusions are inherently more objective and reasonable than
conflicting perceptions and conclusions will lead us to discount or
ignore those who disagree with us.211

204. Id. at 9251.
205. Id. at 9252.
206. Id. at 9250.
207. Sommers, supra note 183, at 1345–46.
208. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on Excessive-Force Claims, 43 TRIAL 74,
76 (2007).
209. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
210. SETH W. STOUGHTON ET AL., INVESTIGATING AND EVALUATING POLICE USES
OF FORCE, CH. 2 (forthcoming 2018).
211. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 842–43 (2009).
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The prior Part identified two types of practical considerations
that will play a significant role in determining whether BWCs can
achieve the desired results. This Part looks beyond the inherent
limitations by examining how the way we use body-worn cameras will
inevitably affect the end results of that use. There is no single
“correct” and obviously superior way of using body-worn cameras;
the question, instead, is whether the adoption and implementation of
body-worn cameras will advance the anticipated benefits or whether
their use will actually undermine those goals.212
This Article fully endorses the conceptual framework that
Richard Myers suggests: applying the “life cycle of the video”
approach to BWC implementation decisions.213 My work here is
intended neither to supplant that approach nor to offer a
comprehensive application of it. There are, of course, a massive range
of policy considerations that are best addressed through consultation
with stakeholders, including officers themselves, interest groups such
as the prosecution and defense bar, and individual community
members. Policies relating to officer and civilian privacy, notification
that an officer is recording and that civilians have (or do not have) the
right to request the officer to not record in different situations, the
transmission and storage of digital video, retention periods,
automated analysis, provision of video to private technology
companies for machine-learning purposes, et cetera, can all affect the
ultimate results of an agency’s BWC program. This Article’s goal is to
engage in a very limited analysis of policy concerns by identifying four
particularly thorny issues that will exert a substantial impact on the
end effect of body-worn camera programs: video creation,
supervisory review, officer review, and discretionary release.214

212. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF BODYWORN CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 16 (2016), https://constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/BodyCamerasRptOnline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2TC-MR4N]
(noting that body-worn cameras “ha[ve] the potential to undermine trust in casual
encounters or foment distrust of officers engaged in community policing”).
213. Richard E. Myers II, Police-Generated Digital Video: Five Key Questions, Multiple
Audiences, and a Range of Answers, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2018).
214. For additional reading on these and other BWC policy issues, see generally
MICHAEL D. WHITE ET AL., KEY TRENDS IN BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY &
PRACTICE: A TWO-YEAR POLICY ANALYSIS OF US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-FUNDED
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2017), http://bwctta.com/sites/default/files/Files
/Resources/Policy%20Analysis%20Year%202%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUD2L8U6].
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A. Video Creation
When will officers activate their BWCs? Which interactions will
be recorded and which will not? If an agency or community adopted
body-worn cameras with the goal of gathering more information—
regardless of how that information will be used—not recording an
interaction obviously fails to advance that goal. Worse, it may
affirmatively undermine the other potential benefits, both behavioral
and signaling. An officer who has not bothered to activate her camera
not only has no extra motivation to behave properly but may actually
be perversely incentivized to behave in ways that she knows are
inappropriate; freedom from observation may serve to relax the
bounds of professional behavior. More directly, while some agencies
and communities adopted body-worn cameras with the intent to
improve police-community relations, an officer’s failure to record
may actually reduce public trust. In one recent officer-involved
shooting, an in-car camera system recorded an officer initiating a
traffic stop then pursing the fleeing suspect on foot until both are out
of the range of the in-car camera. The officer’s body-worn camera
was activated some time later, capturing the shooting itself.215 The
officer’s report indicates that the suspect attempted to point a
handgun at him, leading to a physical struggle, but those events are
described as happening after the officer chased the suspect out of
range of the in-car camera system and before the officer activated his
body-worn camera.216 As in the pre-BWC era, the only available
evidence is the officer’s own description of events. The problem with
that, of course, is that it is all too easy for community members to
draw damning inferences from the absence of video in an incident
that could have, and should have, been recorded, especially when
BWCs were adopted, in large part, to reduce civilian distrust of the
police.
Agencies must identify, ex ante, those situations in which officers
are required to record, those situations in which officers are permitted
to record, and those situations in which officers are prohibited from
recording. Further, they should draft that policy with an eye to
advancing the potential benefits that led them to adopt body-worn
215. City of Burlington Iowa, 2017 Oct 01 Body Cam Video Officer Riffel, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9g37tVHiR8; City of Burlington
Iowa, 2017 Oct 01 Body Cam Video Officer Chiprez, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g54JfDAT1AQ.
216. Letter from Scott D. Brown, Special Assistant Attorney Gen., Iowa Dep’t Justice,
to Amy Beavers, Des Moines Cty. Attorney (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.burlingtoniowa.org
/DocumentCenter/View/1958 [https://perma.cc/6RHH-MNEW].
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cameras in the first place. An agency that adopted this expensive new
technology for the express purpose of changing officer behavior
during police-civilian interactions, for example, might lean toward
adopting a policy that broadly requires officers to record all or most
of those interactions. An agency that is seeking to leverage the
informational benefits of BWCs to support their investigations and
prosecutions, on the other hand, might adopt a more limited policy
that gives officers substantially more discretion to record when they
believe it is to their benefit.217
B.

Supervisory Review

An agency policy that sets out clear standards for mandatory,
permitted, and prohibited recording is a necessary component of a
robust body-worn camera policy, but that policy means very little in
the absence of enforcement. When the Phoenix, Arizona, Police
Department first implemented its body-worn camera program, it
adopted a fairly broad mandatory recording policy: with a few
exceptions, officers were directed to record essentially all of their
investigative or enforcement-related encounters with civilians.218
Officers, however, did not record most of the incidents that they were
required to record; they complied with the mandatory recording
policy only 42.2% of the time.219 By the end of the trial period, their
compliance rate had slipped even further: only about 13.2% of the
interactions that officers were required to record were actually being
recorded.220 The Phoenix Police Department’s mandatory recording
policy was nothing more than a broadly worded paper tiger, in large
part because supervisors were not recognizing, evaluating, or
addressing officers’ failure to abide by the policy. Not only did the
lack of activations fail to advance the informational benefits that the
BWC program could have provided, it undermined the potential
behavioral benefits by establishing a policy violation as the standard
operating procedure.221
The Round Lake Park, Illinois, Police Department offers
another example of how the failure to properly manage a BWC

217. A highly discretionary policy, however, may conflict with the agency’s interest in
the symbolic benefits including the potential for a body-camera system to improve public
trust.
218. KATZ ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT, supra note 87, at 17.
219. Id. at 21.
220. Id.
221. See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD 25 (2008); Seth W. Stoughton, The
Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2229 (2014).
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program can impact the program’s ultimate success. More than eight
months after the agency adopted a body-worn camera system, officers
discovered that the cameras had been recording constantly, even
when they were purportedly turned off or in “sleep” mode. Officers
had inadvertently recorded themselves using the bathroom while onduty and, even more troubling, recorded themselves and their families
on their days off.222 There are a number of troubling implications in
that example, but one of them is that no one was reviewing the video
footage; the police chief said “that he had been unaware of the
recordings until an officer discovered them.”223
When can and should supervisors review an officer’s BWC
recordings? Such a review could be made mandatory; supervisors
could be required to check a random sampling of an officer’s
interactions with civilians to ensure both that the officer is recording
when he are supposed to be and that an officer is performing his
duties appropriately. Alternatively, such a review could be
recommended, but discretionary. Or a supervisor could be prohibited
from reviewing an officer’s videos without some reason to do so, such
as a civilian complaint. Under a restrictive review policy, the receipt
of a complaint may allow a supervisor to review all of the officer’s
videos (to see, for example, whether the officer is engaging in
problematic behavior as a matter of habit) or only the videos related
to the specific complaint. Each policy choice has the potential to have
some effect on the ultimate outcome of an agency’s body-worn
camera program.
C.

Officer Review

One of the more controversial policy decisions is whether to
allow officers to review body-worn camera footage prior to writing
their reports. The most common approach appears to allow officers to
do so without restriction; that is, officers may review BWC videos
prior to writing any or all of their reports. Florida law, for example,
now requires police agencies that have adopted body-worn cameras
to “permit[] a law enforcement officer using a body camera to review
the recorded footage from the body camera, upon his or her own
initiative or request, before writing a report or providing a statement
regarding any event arising within the scope of his or her official
222. Robert McCoppin, Round Lake Park Cops Sue Village Over Body Camera
Bathroom Videos, CHI. TRIBUNE (June 24, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news
/local/breaking/ct-round-lake-park-police-camera-suit-met-20160624-story.html [https://perma.cc
/463R-EV6Z].
223. Id.
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duties.”224 Other entities, including the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and UpTurn, advocate for the opposite
approach: officers should never be allowed to review video footage of
an interaction before writing a report.225
The core concern relates to the potential for officers to base their
reports on the body-camera video itself instead of their own
perceptions or recollections. In the context of incident or arrest
reports, which turn on objective facts rather than the officer’s
perception, a pre-report review may be relatively unproblematic. An
officer writing up a burglary report, for example, should be able to
review the recorded interview with the victim so that the officer can
include in the report a complete list and description of any stolen
items. In the same vein, an officer writing up a DUI arrest would
benefit from the ability to review BWC footage so that she can
accurately record the ways in which the stopped motorist failed field
sobriety exercises. Although officer reports are generally accurate,
the availability of video can make them even more accurate, allowing
agencies to reap the informational benefits of BWCs.226
Use-of-force reports, however, are a different story. The
propriety of a use of force does not turn on the objective facts of the
situation but on the reasonableness of an officer’s perceptions and
actions. In this context, officers should not be able to review BWC
footage before writing a report. Most obviously, it creates both the
opportunity for deception and, even more importantly, the perception
that there is nothing to prevent officers from engaging in deception.
To the extent that deception occurs, it may well occur in some
occasions as a result of the officer being put in a moral dilemma.
Consider, for example, an officer who is interacting with a bellicose
subject and notices, out of the corner of her eye, the subject ball his
hands into fists. Fearing an attack, the officer preemptively uses force,
bringing the subject to the ground. Upon reviewing the video,
however, the officer sees that the subject’s hands, more clearly visible
in the video than in her peripheral vision, were never balled into fists
after all. What is that hapless officer to do? Ideally, perhaps, the
officer would document her perceptions as well as her knowledge that
224. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.1718(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second Reg.
Sess. of 25th Legislature through Mar. 30, 2018).
225. JOEL M. SCHUMM, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, POLICING BODY
CAMERAS: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
24–25 (2017); UPTURN, THE ILLUSION OF ACCURACY: HOW BODY-WORN CAMERA
FOOTAGE CAN DISTORT EVIDENCE 7–9 (2017).
226. See, e.g., D. Dawes et al., Body-Worn Cameras Improve Law Enforcement Officer
Report Writing Accuracy, 4 J. L. ENFORCEMENT 1, 7–9, 15 (2016).
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her perceptions were inaccurate. Officers are only human, however,
and it is entirely plausible to suspect that some number of officers in
that position would leave out any mention of balled fists and instead
find something in the video that they could use to justify their actions.
Beyond concerns about deception, allowing officers to view a
video of events may unconsciously change their memory of those
events.227 Human memory is not encoded like digital data; it is subject
to decay and alteration without our ever being aware of it.228 Have
you ever, for example, had an argument with a family member or
significant other about a factual issue that both you and the other
person remember clearly but entirely differently? Even though both
parties in such an argument may be highly confident in their own
memories, it is clear that one of them, and perhaps both of them, are
not, in fact, remembering the events accurately. Because the
constitutionality of an officers’ use of force requires identifying their
contemporaneous perceptions, allowing officers to potentially change
their memory of those events can only hinder the accuracy of their
report. Someone clearly needs to watch the video to determine
whether the officer’s perceptions were reasonable under the
circumstances, but that is not a question for the officer herself.
Whether an agency allows an officer to review body-worn
camera footage before writing a report, particularly a use-of-force
report, can have a significant effect on the potential symbolic benefits,
behavioral benefits, and informational benefits of a BWC program.
D. Discretionary Release
The last policy consideration I will discuss involves the
discretionary release of BWC footage to the public or interested
parties. Keith Scott was shot and killed by Charlotte-Mecklenburg
police officers on September 20, 2016.229 Shortly after the shooting,
the agency announced that several officers had been equipped with
body-worn cameras and that there was video of the incident;
however, the agency refused to release that video.230 The agency
227. UPTURN, supra note 225, at 5; Dawes et al., supra note 226, at 2.
228. See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, Creating False Memories, 277 SCI. AM. 70 (1997)
(discussing flaws and weaknesses of memory).
229. Protests Break Out After Man Killed in Officer-Involved Shooting In Charlotte,
WCCB CHARLOTTE (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.wccbcharlotte.com/2016/09/21/suspectdead-officer-involved-shooting-university-area/ [https://perma.cc/48V2-NG3J].
230. Ames Alexander, CMPD Withholding More Than Two Hours of Video From
OBSERVER
(Sept.
28,
2016),
Scott
Shooting,
CHARLOTTE
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/special-reports/charlotte-shooting-protests
/article104672831.html [https://perma.cc/9V8U-Y6QZ].
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instead furnished only a description of BWC video, saying the videos
contained nothing of “relevance.”231 The shooting had already
received public attention and criticism, especially after Mr. Scott’s
wife released a video she had taken on her cell phone, and the refusal
to release the officers’ videos quickly exacerbated community
tensions.232
Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s experience is by no means atypical;
agencies that have used body-worn camera videos to promote positive
images of their officers on social media and to defend their officers’
actions in the court of public opinion have also demonstrated some
reluctance to release video that is ambiguous or suggestive of wrongdoing.233 And yet agencies that refuse to release video or do so only
reluctantly can seriously undermine public trust; it is no great
exaggeration to say that having body-worn cameras but refusing to
release video will often prove worse, from a police-community
relations standpoint, than not having BWCs in the first place. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
[I]n the case of a police shooting, non-disclosure of dash-cam
videos can undermine confidence in law enforcement and the
work that officers routinely perform. It can also fuel the
perception that information is being concealed—a concern that
is enhanced when law enforcement officials occasionally reveal
footage that exculpates officers.234
The Seattle Police Department offers a powerful example of an
agency that chose exactly the opposite approach, at least at one point:
for an extended period of time, they posted redacted versions of all
activity within seventy-two hours.235 Delaying the release allows
investigators to find and interview the most important witnesses
without undermining the integrity of the investigation, but having a
specific, short-term deadline for release also mitigates public demands

231. Id.
232. Richard Fausset & Yamiche Alcindor, “Don’t Shoot Him”: Wife’s Pleas to
Charlotte Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2016, at A1.
233. Chicago’s prolonged refusal to release video from the Laquan McDonald shooting
is another poignant example. Jason Meisner & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Forgoes Appeal
After Judge Orders Release of Video of Fatal Police Shooting, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 20,
2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-judge-orders-release-of-video-showing-fatal
-shooting-by-police-officer-20151119-story.html [https://perma.cc/76JB-K3K4].
234. N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887, 907 (N.J. 2017).
235. Cole Zercoe, How the SPD Is Using Youtube to Usher in a New Era of Police
Transparency, POLICEONE (May 11, 2015), https://www.policeone.com/policeproducts/body-cameras/articles/8545907-How-the-SPD-is-using-YouTube-to-usher-in-a-newera-of-police-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/7B2E-QLTR].
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for information. Community members know that they will have the
opportunity to view the video evidence for themselves, regardless of
whether the video inculpates the officer, exculpates the officer, or is
entirely ambiguous. Such a policy avoids any appearance that the
agency is hiding information or improperly protecting its officers,
which can only bolster public trust.
There are, of course, a host of other policy issues that agencies
will need to grapple with, from addressing the security of transmission
and storage to the role, if any, of automated analytical tools and from
how to best train officers to use BWCs on the street to how to best
educate supervisors, investigators, and the public in the limits of video
footage. This Part explored four especially thorny policy questions:
When must, can, and mustn’t officers activate their BWCs? When can
and must supervisors check the existence or content of BWC footage?
When can officers review BWC footage? And how should the agency
handle the discretionary decision to release video footage when that
release is not legally required? None of these questions are reducible
to a single correct answer. Instead, the answers should be developed
with an eye toward achieving the benefits that the agency, working
with internal and external stakeholders, has identified and prioritized.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of BWCs is both widespread and growing, and it is
not difficult to see why. Police executives and community leaders,
elected officials and activists, officers and, of course, BWC
manufacturers have identified with a wide array of potential benefits.
Body-worn cameras promise to improve police-community relations,
to reduce police uses of force, to enhance the accuracy of use-of-force
investigations, to facilitate officer training, to definitely resolve
complaints about officer rudeness, to discourage frivolous complaints,
to support criminal prosecutions, to improve officer supervision, to
assist in civil litigation, to build public trust, and so on. The assurances
that a particularly technology will meaningfully improve various
aspects of policing are nothing new. The same promises, or ones like
them, were made in the context of in-car camera systems.236 How can
the various claims be fairly assessed so that police agencies and the

236. Long-time police officers and policing scholars will recognize other innovations
that were billed as “the solution” to a particular problem. Pepper spray and TASERs were
both heralded in their time as significant, if not complete, solutions to the problem of
police use-of-force.
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communities they serve can determine whether and how to
implement a body-worn camera program?
This Article offers a framework for thinking about body-worn
cameras. It does so providing a taxonomy of benefits, by identifying
limitations, and by discussing policy considerations. It classifies the
potential benefits into three different categories and explaining the
causal mechanism for each. The first category is symbolic benefits.
Symbolic benefits include improvements to public trust and the
perception of police legitimacy, which can strengthen the policecommunity relationship. An agency’s adoption of BWCs can serve as
a signal to constituents that the agency takes community concerns
seriously and that the agency is taking affirmative steps to promote
professional behavior among officers and reduce uses of force. The
second category is behavioral benefits. Body-worn cameras, it is
thought, can change both officer and civilian behavior; BWCs will
encourage officers to comply with legal and administrative rules and
will encourage both officers and civilians to be more civil in their
interactions and to reduce resistance and aggression that can
contribute to violent encounters. To the extent that we see behavioral
changes, those changes may be the result of some combination of the
observer effect, deterrence, conformity, or experiential updating. The
final category is informational benefits. Video footage, it is commonly
believed, is more accurate, objective, and comprehensive than other
forms of evidence. Having video footage of police-civilian interactions
will shine a critical light on “some of the most opaque domains of
criminal procedure.”237 The resulting information can be used for
police accountability, criminal and civil litigation, investigations,
training, machine learning, and in a host of other ways.
It would be a mistake, though, to assume that the adoption of
body-worn cameras will lead inexorably to the fulfillment of their
various promises. The Article identifies the inherent limitations of
body-worn cameras, as well as the people who watch BWC videos,
and describes how those limitations can weaken or even undermine
cameras’ potential value. Even when the limitations are not inherent
in the technology or the individuals using the technology, merely
having a piece of technology cannot begin to guarantee that an
agency will enjoy the potential benefits. For that, a BWC program
must be carefully considered ex ante, then implemented with an eye
toward achieving the agency’s goals. A successful implementation
will, in most cases, require not just the acquisition of BWCs, but also
237. Fan, supra note 11, at 929.
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appropriate policies, procedures, training, and supervision, not to
mention some periodic assessment of performance and
reconsideration of whether and how the technology is having the
desired effect. Failure on one or more of those points may well result
in a BWC undermining, rather than facilitating, the desired outcome.
This Article identifies a non-exhaustive series of important policy
considerations.
In that way, BWCs are no different than other tools. Tools
should be used to accomplish normatively desirable tasks when they
are an efficient way of accomplishing or facilitating that task. This
Article has provided a framework that police executives, elected
officials, and community members can apply to make more informed
decisions about whether and how body-worn cameras can, in Judge
Scheindlin’s words, “serve a variety of useful functions.”238

238. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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